STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FIRSTMERIT BANK F/K/A LIFE SAVINGS BANK, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Transportation appeals a trial court's finding that it is liable for a bank's moving expenses incurred in anticipation of a highway project that would affect the bank's leased premises. The court reverses, holding that equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action, and that the bank failed to establish the required elements of estoppel.
The court reverses the trial court's finding of liability. Equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action, and therefore was not a proper vehicle for relief. Additionally, the bank failed to establish the first element of equitable estoppel—a material misrepresentation—because DOT did not represent that the property would not be condemned when it in fact would be.
[1] Equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense, not an independent cause of action.
[2] A party claiming equitable estoppel must prove a representation contrary to a later-asserted position, reliance on that representation, and a detrimental change in positi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Estoppel is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). As such, it was not a proper vehicle for relief in this case.”
Establishes the fundamental procedural error in allowing estoppel to serve as the basis for a cause of action rather than as a defense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFirstMerit Bank leased space in a building along U.S. Highway 19 in Pinellas County. After learning through DOT's precondemnation activities that DOT …
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WHATLEY, Judge.
The Department of. Transportation (DOT) appeals an order finding it liable to First-Merit Bank (the bank) for moving expenses incurred in anticipation of a taking. We reverse.
The bank was a lessee of space in a building located along U.S. Highway 19 in Pinellas County. The bank decided to relocate after it became aware through DOT’S customary precondemnation activities that DOT was planning to take part of the building’s parking lot and to eliminate direct access to U.S. Highway 19 as part of a project to alter that highway. The bank determined that these changes would cause the site to no longer be viable for a commercial banking facility. Subsequent to its move, the bank filed a complaint against DOT alleging causes of action for inverse condemnation and for what was labeled equitable estoppel. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it found that DOT was equitably es-topped to deny payment to the bank for its moving and relocation costs. As a result of this finding, the trial court declined to reach the bank’s inverse condemnation claim.
Estoppel is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). As such, it was not a proper vehicle for relief in this case. Even if it were, the bank did not establish all of its elements.
The elements of equitable estoppel are: “1) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted position; 2) reliance on that representation; and 3) a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the representation and reliance thereon.” Kuge v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. Of Retirement, 449 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The trial court found that the bank had proven the second and third elements of reliance and detrimental change in position. However, the trial court did not, because it could not, find that the first element was proven. In its complaint, the bank alleged that by virtue of certain enumerated actions, DOT represented to the bank that its property would be condemned when it was in fact not condemned. The bank stated in its complaint, however, that although a condemnation action was filed with respect to the property in September 1995 and dismissed in October 1995, DOT was merely delaying the project, not terminating it. Thus, the bank cannot assert that DOT has changed its position with regard to the condemnation of part of the property the bank was leasing. Furthermore, even if DOT had changed its position, we question whether the bank could have established that it relied on DOT’s representation because it relocated before the original condemnation action was filed.
In light of the fact that the trial court declined to determine the bank’s inverse condemnation claim, we will not address it.
Accordingly, we reverse the order finding that DOT is liable to pay the bank’s moving and relocation expenses.
PARKER, C.J., and GREEN, J., concur. .
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Flagship Resort Dev. Corp. v. Interval Int'l, Inc., 28 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…e issue, we find that equitable estoppel is not a cause of action, but an affirmative defense. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.2001) (equitable estoppel is a defensive doctrine); Dep’t of Transp. v. First-Merit Bank, 711 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Thus, as a matter of law, it is not a proper cause of action, and summary judgment was proper on this point alone. Nonetheless, even if equitable estoppel were an offensive doctrine, Flagship failed to satisfy the first re…
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State v. Mied, Inc., 869 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…lly, we address the question of whether the trial court properly submitted MIED’s equitable estoppel claim to the jury. In this state, equitable estoppel is a defensive doctrine rather than a cause of action. See Dep’t of Transp. v. FirstMerit Bank, 711 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Florida has long recognized that “[e]quitable estoppel is not designed to aid a litigant in gaining something, but only in preventing a loss.” Kerivan v. Fogal, 156 Fla. 92, 22 So. 2d 584, 586 (1945). Such accords with the…
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CRMSuite Corp. v. Gen. Motors Co. (M.D. Fla. 2020)…nder Florida law equitable estoppel is not a standalone cause of action, but an affirmative defense. This is correct. See State, Agency for Health Care Admin. v. MIED, Inc., 869 So. 2d 13, 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Dep’t of Transp. v. FirstMerit Bank, 711 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Plaintiff concedes this point in its response. Dkt. 47 at 17 n.2. Count IV is therefore dismissed with prejudice. E. Count V: Promissory Estoppel Count V asserts a claim for promissory estoppel. GM argues count V should…
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- Kuge v. State, 449 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)