HAROLD THOMAS REYNOLDS, APPELLANT,
v.
TRUDY REYNOLDS, APPELLEE
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In a divorce case, Harold Reynolds appeals the trial court's orders regarding alimony, child support, equitable distribution of assets, attorney's fees, and dependency of a disabled child. The appellate court reversed the equitable distribution award and attorney's fees award, finding the trial court abused its discretion by leaving the appellant without adequate present assets and by awarding excessive attorney's fees.
The court reversed the equitable distribution award and attorney's fees award, finding the trial court abused its discretion. The distribution left appellant without present assets except what he could receive only by terminating his pension early, and the attorney's fees award was excessive when considered with the alimony, child support, and distribution awards. The court affirmed the remaining points on appeal.
[1] An equitable distribution plan may constitute an abuse of discretion if it leaves one party with no present assets other than a future benefit contingent on early termina…
[2] An award of attorney's fees may constitute an abuse of discretion when considered in conjunction with the trial court's awards of alimony, child support, and equitable di…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the equitable distribution plan left appellant without any present assets other than the $15,293.58 he would receive only if he elected early termination of his pension plan”
Establishes that the distribution was inequitable because appellant had no practical access to present assets
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorcing and had a disabled child. The trial court distributed assets as follows: Appellant received a 1979 Oldsmobile ($500) and a …
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DELL, Judge.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in the alimony and child support awards, the equitable distribution of the parties’ assets, the award of attorney’s fees to appellee, the decision relating to the dependency of the parties’ disabled child, and the delegation to appellee for preparation of the final judgment. We reverse the equitable distribution award and the award of attorney’s fees.
The trial court distributed the parties’ assets as follows: Appellant received a 1979 Oldsmobile valued at $500.00, and a retirement plan with a present value of $94,407.58. Appellant is not eligible to receive payments for the full amount under this plan until July 8, 2002. Appellee received the marital home with equity of $61,000.00, a 1992 Cadillac valued at $4,000.00, jewelry valued at $4,780.00, monies from joint accounts of $14,-000.00, appellant’s 401K plan valued at $15,-000.00, and the furnishings of the marital' home.
In paragraph 7(k) of the final judgment, the court found that the retirement plan had a present value of $94,407.58. In paragraph 10, the court found that the plan had a present value of $110,000.00. The trial court may have erroneously added the termination value of the plan ($15,293.25) to its present day value of $94,407.58. We find merit in appellant’s argument and hold that the trial court abused its discretion because the equitable distribution plan left appellant without any present assets other than the $15,293.58 he would receive only if he elected early termination of his pension plan. See Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). We also find merit in appellant’s argument that the award of attorney’s fees constituted an abuse of discretion when considered with the trial court’s award of alimony, child support, and plan of equitable distribution.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to restructure the plan of equitable distribution. We also reverse the award of attorney’s fees with leave to the trial court to reconsider appellee’s claim for attorney’s fees in conjunction with the revised plan of equitable distribution. We affirm the final judgment as to the remaining points on appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.
GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ. concur.
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Moorehead v. Moorehead, 745 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…0 in cash. The husband complains that the court reversibly erred because he was left with only future assets, his pension, while the wife was left with present assets. In support of his argument he cites this court’s opinion in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 711 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In Reynolds, the wife’s distribution included the equity in the marital home plus jewelry and cash in the amount of $29,000, while the husband was left with his pension plan, from which he could generate $15,000 in cash onl…
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Link v. Link, 897 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…property so as to equalize the assets. In the amended final judgment, each party received $779,503 in liquid and illiquid assets.1,2 The court did not give one spouse liquid assets and the other spouse illiquid assets. Compare Reynolds v. Reynolds, 711 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in awarding one spouse only liquid assets and the other only illiquid assets). We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Next, the former wife contends that the court e…
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KAY v. KAY, 723 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…of the party to be charged or taken from the amounts otherwise distributed to that party in equitable distribution or by making or adjusting a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) to reach his interest in the pension. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 711 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Johnson v. Johnson, 602 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Particularly in the light of the husband’s far superi- or financial situation based on his illiquid interest in the pension fund, see Chandler v. Chandler, 624 So. 2d 855 (…
Authorities Cited
- Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)