PENNSYLVANIA LUMBERMENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE SUNRISE CLUB, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, SUNDALE, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ASSOCIATED AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PHILIP SCUTIERI, JR., TRUSTEE, AND SUNRISE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES; THE SUNRISE CLUB, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, SUNDALE, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ASSOCIATED AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PHILIP SCUTIERI, JR., TRUSTEE, AND SUNRISE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS, V. PENNSYLVANIA LUMBERMENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE; THE SUNRISE CLUB, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, SUNDALE, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ASSOCIATED AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PHILIP SCUTIERI, JR., TRUSTEE, AND SUNRISE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS, V. PENNSYLVANIA LUMBERMENS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company appealed the denial of attorney's fees in a Hurricane Andrew insurance coverage dispute, while the insureds appealed an adverse jury verdict. The court affirmed the verdict against the insureds but reversed the denial of attorney's fees to the insurer based on a good-faith settlement offer.
The court affirmed the jury verdict for the carrier, finding ample evidence supported an adverse verdict on both the carrier's alternative defenses. The court reversed the denial of attorney's fees, holding that the $300,000 settlement offer was made in good faith under the statute, entitling the carrier to recover appropriate fees incurred after rejection of the offer.
[1] A jury verdict will not be overturned as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence if there is ample evidence to justify an adverse verdict on any of the grounds pr…
[2] A trial court is not required to permit a post-verdict jury interview in the absence of a proper showing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In fact, there is ample evidence to justify an adverse verdict as to both.”
Supports affirming the jury verdict for the carrier on both alternative defenses (no recoverable loss and fraud)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe insureds claimed damages from Hurricane Andrew under an insurance policy issued by Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company. The carrier d…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The plaintiffs-insureds appeal from an adverse judgment rendered on a general jury verdict for the defendant carrier in an action claiming additional insured damages allegedly caused by Hurricane Andrew. In a separate appeal, the carrier challenges the denial of its claim for attorney’s fees. I.
The insureds’ primary claim is that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict for the carrier was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We cannot agree. The carrier defended this cause on the separate grounds that the insureds had sustained no recoverable loss beyond $513,000.00 which had been voluntarily paid, and that recovery was barred altogether because of their fraud in the claim process. See American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kiel Invs., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Wong Ken v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 685 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
Because the plaintiffs affirmatively and successfully resisted a special jury interrogatory which would have separated these issues, the insureds can win on this point only if neither possible finding against them is supported by the record. See Barth v. Khubani, 705 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
In fact, there is ample evidence to justify an adverse verdict as to both. See Dennies Contracting Co. v. Hersh, 702 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Wong Ken, 685 So. 2d at 1002; Espino v. Anez, 665 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Nuta v. Genders, 617 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Hirsch v. Mount Sinai Medical Ctr., Inc., 458 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
There is also no merit in the claim that the trial court should have permitted a post-verdict jury interview. See Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1991); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 610 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Life From the Sea, Inc. v. Levy, 502 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 509 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla.1987). The judgment for the carrier on appeal in case numbers 96-3080 and 96-3081 is therefore affirmed.
II.
Turning to the insurer’s separate appeal in case number 97-329, we reverse the denial of attorney’s fees claimed under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997).
During the litigation, the insurance carrier made a properly structured offer to settle the case for $300,000.00. It is clear as a matter of law — considered in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances, particularly the relative strength of the respective parties’ cases and the fact that the proposal in essence included foregoing the very arguable right to a return of the amounts the company had previously paid, see Wong Ken, 685 So. 2d at 1004 n. 1 — that the $300,000.00 offer was made “in good faith” within the meaning of the statute. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Eagleman v. Eagleman, 673 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Bridges v. Newton, 556 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); see also Peoples Gas Sys. v. Acme Gas Corp., 689 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968, 968 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1992).
Since the other prerequisites of recovery under the statute are admittedly present, this holding requires that, on remand, appropriate fees incurred subsequent to the rejection of the offer be awarded the carrier.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2006)…rkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So. 2d 210, 223 (Fla.2003). The district courts, too, have applied the offer of judgment statute to insurance cases, including those involving property insurance, see Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), liability insurance, Rabatie v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and uninsured motorist benefits. See Weesner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 711 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Allstate Ins. Co.…
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Earnest & Stewart, Inc. v. Codina, 732 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ications, — So. 2d -, 1998 WL 870859 (Fla. 4th DCA Case No. 97-2052, opinion filed, December 9, 1998)[23 FLW D2687]; Evans v. Piotraczk, 724 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) [23 FLW D2725]; Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the case is remanded for the trial court to make these determinations and for other appropriate proceedings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. NESBITT, J., concurs. . The agreement provided, in part, that Ross…
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U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Liliana Cahuasqui, 760 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…tatute.11 Moreover, this court and the other appellate courts of this state have consistently applied section 768.79 in insurance cases despite the existence of section 627.428. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593 (Fla, 3d DCA 1998) (property insurance); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 689 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (property insurance); Rabatie v. U.S. Security Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (liability insurance); see also Allstate Ins.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (18 total)
- Baptist Hosp. OF Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1991)
- Susanne Rae Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Eagleman v. Atilla Eagleman, 673 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko, 695 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Martinez v. Irwin Lichter and Lourdes Pons, 689 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- KEN v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 685 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Life From THE SEA, Inc. v. Shlomo Levy and Charen Levy, 502 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Peoples GAS Sys., Inc. v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank of N. Miami Beach, 556 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Cary Kogen, 665 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)