JAMES C. GAINER, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
FIDDLESTICKS COUNTRY CLUB, INC., APPELLEE
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The court reversed a summary judgment foreclosing a homeowners' association lien against a tax deed holder who refused to purchase a required country club membership. The court held that section 617.312, enacted in 1995, cannot be retroactively applied to a tax deed issued in 1994, and therefore the earlier statute exempting money-requiring covenants from surviving tax sales applies.
Section 617.312 cannot be retroactively applied to a tax deed issued before its effective date. Therefore, section 197.573 controls, and the membership covenant did not survive the tax sale because it requires expenditure of money for a purpose outside the statutory exceptions.
[1] A covenant requiring a property owner to expend money for a purpose, not falling within exceptions for sanitary conditions, nuisances, or undesirable conditions, does not…
[2] A statute enacted after a tax deed sale cannot be retroactively applied to alter the survival of covenants that existed prior to the statute's enactment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a covenant does not survive a tax sale if it requires "the grantee to expend money for any purpose, except one that may require that the premises be kept in a sanitary or sightly condition or one to abate nuisances or undesirable conditions."”
Establishes the operative exception under section 197.573 that excludes money-requiring covenants from surviving tax sales
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFiddlesticks Country Club Subdivision includes a golf course and a 1982 declaration requiring all lot owners to purchase country club memberships. In …
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
James C. Gainer, as trustee, appeals a final summary judgment foreclosing a claim of lien against property in the Fiddlesticks Country Club Subdivision (Fiddlesticks). Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc. (the homeowners’ association), claimed a lien because Mr. Gainer refused to pay for a membership in the country club, as required by the relevant declaration of covenants. We reverse because the trial court improperly applied section 617.312, Florida Statutes (1995), to a tax deed that was issued prior to the effective date of that statute.
Fiddlesticks is a residential development, including golf courses. In 1982, the developer recorded a declaration that contained a covenant requiring all lot owners to buy memberships in the country club. Cf. § 617.301(4), Fla. Stat. (1997) (defining “declaration of covenants”). On November 7, 1994, Mr. Gainer purchased a tax deed for a lot in Fiddlesticks. Thereafter, the homeowners’ association demanded that Mr. Gainer buy a membership in the country club, and filed a claim of lien when no membership was purchased.
In the trial court, Mr. Gainer argued that, pursuant to section 197.573, Florida Statutes (1993), the covenant did not survive the tax sale. Section 197.573 has long provided that a covenant does not survive a tax sale if it requires “the grantee to expend money for any purpose, except one that may require that the premises be kept in a sanitary or sightly condition or one to abate nuisances or undesirable conditions.” § 197.573(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). There is no dispute that this covenant requires Mr. Gainer to expend money for a purpose that does not fall within the exceptions.
The homeowners’ association argued that this case was controlled by section 617.312, which expressly provides that such covenants are enforceable after the issuance of a tax deed. The difficulty with this argument is that the statute was enacted in 1995, after the tax deed sale in this case. See ch. 95-274, § 62, Laws of Fla. The trial court interpreted section 197.573 in light of section 617.312, as the most recent legislative pronouncement, and entered a judgment of foreclosure on the claim of lien.
Section 617.312 did not exist when Mr. Gainer purchased the tax deed. There is no ambiguity in section 197.573 that is clarified by the subsequent enactment of section 617.312. Therefore, there is no authority allowing a retroactive application of section 617.312 to this case. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1995); Landi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and YOUNG, ROBERT A., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995)
- Landi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)