ROBERTS & ROBERTS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
BARNETT BANK OF TALLAHASSEE, N.A.; CAPITAL ASPHALT, INC.; TALLAHASSEE SPEEDWAY, INC.; NORTH FLORIDA MATERIALS, INC., F/K/A SONAS SYSTEMS OF FLORIDA, INC.; TRI-STATE CARRIERS, INC.; RO-MAC LUMBER & SUPPLY OF TALLAHASSEE, INC.; FORMS MANAGEMENT, INC.; AND ASPHALT MATERIALS, INC., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Roberts & Roberts appeals summary judgment orders granted in favor of Barnett Bank and Capital Asphalt, and the denial of its motion to amend its complaint. The court reverses the summary judgments and remands, finding genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the appellant accepted a returned deposit check and elected its remedy.
Summary judgment was not appropriate because genuine issues relating to material facts existed, including whether the appellant unconditionally accepted the returned deposit check and elected its remedy. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow amendment under the liberal Florida rule governing pleading amendments.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when genuine issues of material fact exist, or when different reasonable inferences can be drawn from uncontroverted facts.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to allow a party to amend its complaint unless allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Summary judgment is proper only where 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'”
Establishes the legal standard for summary judgment in Florida
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoberts & Roberts apparently had a dispute involving a returned deposit check and remedies available to it in relation to Barnett Bank and Capital Asp…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Liberal Amendment Of Pleadings cases and more on FLexlaw
MICKLE, Judge.
Roberts & Roberts, Inc., appeals 1) an order denying its motion for leave to file an amendment to its complaint, 2) an order granting summary final judgment in favor of Barnett Bank of Tallahassee on all counts of the complaint, and 3) an order granting summary judgment in favor of Capital Asphalt on all counts of the complaint. Summary judgment is proper only where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966). Having carefully reviewed the extensive record in this appeal, we conclude that there are genuine issues relating to material facts (and there are different reasonable inferences deriving from certain uncontroverted facts) relating to both motions for Summary judgment. The disputed factual issues include, inter alia, whether the appellant unconditionally accepted the returned deposit check and elected its remedy. Under these circumstances, summary judgment is not appropriate.
Accordingly, we reverse the orders granting summary judgment in favor of Barnett Bank and Capital Asphalt, and we remand for further proceedings. Given the liberal Florida rule governing amendment to pleadings, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to amend is complaint to add a third count for damages. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190; Spradley v. Stick, 622 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“[Rjefusal to allow amendment of a pleading constitutes an abuse of discretion unless it clearly appears that allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party; the privilege to amend has been abused; or amendment would be futile.”).
REVERSING orders granting summary judgment in favor of Barnett Bank of Tallahassee and Capital Asphalt, and REMANDING for further proceedings, WITH DIRECTIONS that the trial court allow the appellant to amend its complaint.
LAWRENCE, J., and KUDER, JOHN P., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Advanced Sys. Design, Inc. v. Felton, 790 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…result of the actions of appellee, Charles Felton, we affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for summary judgment, motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial. See Roberts & Roberts, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, N.A., 707 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), and Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 211 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). AFFIRMED. BOOTH, MINER and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.…
-
Amado Evarito Garcia v. M & T Mortg. Corp., 980 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.” Additional substantive damages are new matters subject to the filing of a supplemental pleading. See, e.g., Roberts & Roberts v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, N.A., 707 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (a trial court should grant a petitioner’s motion for leave to amend its complaint to add third count for damages). The Association’s first cross-claim sought $912.20 plus interest in damages from Garcia. The Association’s amend…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Spradley v. Doctor Michael O. Stick & Hamilton Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 622 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)