JOSHUA LAW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joshua Law appeals his sentencing as a youthful offender for burglary and petit theft, challenging the restitution order and conditions of probation requiring drug/alcohol rehabilitation. The court affirms, finding the restitution order proper despite police recovery of some items, the trial court retained authority to determine restitution amounts beyond the 60-day modification period, and the rehabilitation condition was reasonably related to his crimes and admittedly drug-motivated conduct.
The restitution order was proper because the record did not demonstrate victims recovered their entire loss, and the trial court retained authority to determine restitution amounts beyond 60 days since the restitution order was entered timely. The drug/alcohol rehabilitation condition was valid because the state established a nexus between the condition and the crimes, given Law's admitted drug problem and his statement that he committed the offenses to obtain money for drugs. Delegation to the probation officer to supervise the rehabilitation program was proper as long as discretion was exercised for rehabilitative purposes only.
[1] A court may order restitution even if some stolen property has been recovered by victims, as long as the victims have not recovered their entire loss.
[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period if an order of restitution was entered timely.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If an order of restitution has been entered in a timely manner, a court can determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period.”
Establishes that trial courts retain authority to set restitution amounts even after the 60-day modification period expires, provided the restitution order itself was timely entered
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaw pleaded nolo contendere to burglary of a dwelling and petit theft. The trial court sentenced him as a youthful offender to two years' imprisonment…
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ANTOON, Judge.
Joshua Law (defendant)'appeals his sentences which were imposed by the trial court. We affirm.
After the defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to the charges of burglary of a dwelling and petit theft,1 the trial court sentenced him as a youthful offender to a term of two years’ imprisonment followed by five years’ probation. As a condition of probation the court directed the defendant to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program. The court also directed him to pay restitution, but the court reserved jurisdiction to later determine the amount which was owed to the victims of the defendant’s crime. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from this sentencing order. The defendant first challenges the trial court’s decision to enter a restitution order. Specifically, the defendant argues that the restitution order’ must be stricken because the police have already returned the stolen items to the victims and therefore the victims are not entitled to receive restitution. This argument must be rejected as meritless because the instant record does not demonstrate that the victims have recovered the entire loss incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. In fact, the only documents in the record pertaining to this issue are police reports which indicate that some of the stolen property was recovered by the police. However, there, is no indication that the victims recovered all of the losses caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offenses as provided by section 775.089(l)(a)l-2 of the Floridá Statutes (1995).
The defendant also argues that, in any event, the trial court is now without [*634-636] authority to enter an award of restitution in this case because more than sixty days have elapsed from the date the sentencing order was entered. Rule 3.800(c) of the Florida Rules of briminal Procedure authorizes a trial court to modify a defendant’s sentence for a period of sixty days after the date the sentence is imposed. See also § 948.03(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995). However, our supreme court has explained that “[i]f an order of restitution has been entered in a timely manner, a court can determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period.” State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla.1993). Here, since the trial court’s order of restitution was entered timely, this claim of error is rejected as meritless.
The defendant also raises two challenges to his probation order. Specifically, he first argues that the condition of probation which requires him to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation' program must be stricken because the condition is not related to the crimes for which he was convicted. See Grate v. State, 623 So. 2d 591, 592 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)(condition of probation must be related to the crime of which the offender was convicted). This argument is completely devoid of merit because at the sentencing hearing the state clearly established a nexus between this condition of probation and the defendant’s crimes. The defendant, his mother, and his attorney all stated that the defendant had a drug problem. Moreover, the defendant admitted that he committed the instant offenses in order to obtain money to buy drugs.
The defendant further argues that the trial court’s order requiring him to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program “as recommended by [his] probation [officer]” is improper because this language vests unbridled discretion with the probation officer. Again, we disagree. Our supreme court has explained that courts may delegate “authority for a probation officer to supervise the counseling required of some defendants, so long as this discretion is to be used only for rehabilitative purposes and does not take on the character of an essentially judicial act.” Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla.1991).
Finding no valid claims of error, we affirm the defendant’s sentences.
JUDGMENTS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur. . §§ 810.02, 812.014, Fla. Stat. (1995).
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A.M.B. v. State, 917 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…M.B. appeals that requirement, contending that such a condition is unrelated to the offenses of which he was adjudicated delinquent. We agree. A condition of probation must be related to the crime of which the offender was convicted. Law v. State, 705 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Grate v. State, 623 So. 2d 591, 592 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). “A special condition of probation is invalid if a condition has no relationship to the crime committed, relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal or…
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Connor v. State, 944 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…r the circumstances, because the order establishing the restitution obligation was entered in a timely manner, the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period in rule 3.800(c).”); Law v. State, 705 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Hence, as the court in Sanderson explained, the determination of the amount of restitution is not controlled by the time limitations of rule 3.800. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d at 472-73; see also Gladfelter, 618 So. 2d at 1365 (“Becau…
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Carter v. State, 975 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…se conditions aimed at rehabilitation, including counseling. Nothing in this record suggests that this delegation of discretion has led to a punitive result or is so broad as to usurp an essentially judicial function. Id. at 1372. In Law v. State, 705 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), this Court, relying on the [*1201] standard set out in Larson, dismissed a challenge to a probationary condition “requiring [the defendant] to complete a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program as recommended by [his] probat…
Authorities Cited
- Myren Wayne Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Gaines, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993)
- Denson Emory Grate v. State, 623 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)