IN THE INTEREST OF BABY BOY G., A CHILD. PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE PARENTS, APPELLANTS,
v.
C.V., APPELLEE
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Prospective adoptive parents appealed the dismissal of their declaratory judgment suit seeking to excuse the biological father's consent to adoption based on prebirth abandonment, and also appealed an order denying their motion to intervene in a separate termination of parental rights proceeding. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal and denial of intervention but clarified that the trial court lacked authority to prohibit the prospective parents from pursuing other available remedies.
The prospective adoptive parents lacked standing to bring the declaratory judgment action and lacked standing to intervene in the termination proceeding. However, the trial court was without authority to adjudicate any of the prospective parents' rights or prohibit them from pursuing any claim or remedy that might be available in another proceeding relating to the adoption.
[1] Prospective adoptive parents lack standing to bring a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine whether a biological father's consent to adoption should be excused…
[2] A trial court may dismiss a declaratory judgment action for lack of standing and because the requested relief constitutes an advisory opinion or seeks factual findings de…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the prospective parents lacked standing to bring the action and were improperly seeking either an advisory opinion or factual findings on matters that would be determinative in other pending cases, which were not before the trial court”
The court's rationale for affirming the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action due to lack of standing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBaby Boy G. was the subject of two related proceedings: a declaratory judgment action brought by prospective adoptive parents seeking to determine whe…
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PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated appeal, the prospective adoptive parents of Baby Boy G. challenge the dismissal with prejudice of their declaratory judgment suit in trial court case number 96-10097-D, and an order denying their motion to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding in trial court case number 93915-PC.
In the declaratory judgment action, the prospective adoptive parents sought to determine whether the consent of C.V., the biological father and the appellee herein, should be excused for reasons of prebirth abandonment. The trial court found that the prospective parents lacked standing to bring the action and were improperly seeking either an advisory opinion or factual findings on matters that would be determinative in other pending cases, which were not before the trial court. We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and, therefore, affirm the order dismissing the declaratory judgment action.
In trial court case number 93915-PC, Adoption By Choice, Inc., a licensed child placement agency, sought to terminate the natural parents’ rights to Baby Boy G. and to have the child permanently committed to it for subsequent adoption. The prospective adoptive parents filed a motion to intervene in that action, claiming to be necessary parties. The trial court denied the motion by a written order, finding that the prospective parents lacked standing in that instance as well. By the same order, the trial court dismissed the entire termination action with prejudice, refusing to allow Adoption By Choice, Inc., or the prospective adoptive parents to file amended pleadings. Adoption By Choice, Inc., did not appeal the decision; though, the prospective parents have challenged that portion of the order which denies their motion to intervene.
Because the agency’s action was dismissed with prejudice, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene. We do further find, however, that after dismissing the main action and denying the motion to intervene, the trial court was without authority to adjudicate any of the prospective parents’ rights or otherwise prohibit them from pursuing any claim or remedy that might be available to them in another proceeding relating to the adoption of Baby Boy G..
Affirmed.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
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In re the Termination of Parental Rights for the Proposed Adoption OF Baby A. v. Gift of Life Adoptions, Inc., 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…that hold that prospective adoptive parents have no right to intervene in a termination proceeding, see, e.g., Gift of Life, Inc. v. D.E.F. (In re D.L.G.), 802 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Prospective Adoptive Parents v. C.V. (In re Baby Boy G), 703 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), Judge Fleming denied the prospective adoptive parents’ motion to intervene. Judge Fleming entered a separate order appointing a guardian ad litem for purposes of the termination proceeding. It is undisputed that Judge Fleming or…
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Maya Winddancer v. Stein, 765 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…onally, the portion of the trial court’s order threatening sanction for future non-compliance with visitation is either non-binding surplusage or an improper advisory opinion on matters which were not before the trial court. Cf. Baby Boy G. v. C.V., 703 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Trial judges are not without [*749] power to admonish litigants in appropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, the order here goes too far by purporting to fashion remedies that are purely hypothetical. Accordingly, we GRANT…