CYNTHIA ANN DAWSON/KNAPP, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Court reversed denial of motion to correct illegal sentence where sentencing documents conflicted with trial court's oral pronouncement regarding concurrent versus consecutive sentences.
When sentencing documents conflict with the trial court's oral pronouncement, the trial court must address the discrepancy on remand and attach record portions supporting its determination.
[1] When sentencing documents conflict with a trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence, the trial court must address the discrepancy on remand and attach record portions…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKnapp was sentenced in four cases on May 18, 1992. The trial court's oral pronouncement indicated sentences in two cases would run concurrently with e…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Oral Pronouncement Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Cynthia Knapp challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence.
On May 18, 1992, the trial court sentenced Knapp in four cases. The transcript of the sentencing hearing discloses that the trial court structured Knapp’s sentences so that she received a total of twenty-two years in prison in the first two cases. The transcript further reflects that she was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count in the remaining two eases. The sentences in the latter cases were to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with the sentences imposed in the first two cases. Knapp alleges that the sentencing documents in ease number 86-14764 indicate she was sentenced to five years on each count to run consecutively to her initial sentences rather that concurrently. She asserts that the trial court’s oral pronouncement contemplated a concurrent sentence in case number 86-14764.
The trial court’s order denying Knapp’s motion to correct an illegal sentence does not respond to this issue, nor did the trial court attach any document in case number 86-14764 reflecting the May 18, 1992, sentencing.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider the merits of the contention raised in Knapp’s motion. See Williams v. State, 676 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Sellers v. State, 591 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). If the trial court determines that it is without merit, it must attach those portions of the record that refute Knapp’s claim of failure to follow the trial court’s oral sentencing pronouncement.
FRANK, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur. PARKER, J., dissents with opinion.
PARKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Knapp appeared before the trial court in 1992, admitted violating her probation on seventeen felony charges, and pleaded guilty to a new grand theft charge. The trial court imposed a guidelines sentence of twenty-two years in prison. Knapp filed this motion in 1996 to challenge these sentences. Her motion was filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 and alleges her sentences are illegal.
The supreme court has concluded that a sentence is illegal “if the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law.” King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (Fla.1996).
See also Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995).
In reviewing Knapp’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, the majority opinion relies upon two of this court’s opinions, Williams v. State, 676 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and Sellers v. State, 591 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
In Williams, this court reviewed a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800 and reversed and remanded the ease with directions to the trial court to review the record and determine whether there was a discrepancy between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and the written sentences. Based upon the definition of an illegal sentence found in King and Davis, I conclude that Williams was incorrectly decided. In Sellers, the defendant’s allegation was that, following a plea bargain agreement to plea to one felony, his circuit court documents erroneously reflected two surplus convictions which were to have been dismissed. I agree that a judgment and sentence contained in the court file which reflects crimes that the prosecution and trial court agreed to dismiss would constitute an illegal sentence. Any judgment and sentence in a court file for which no charge remains pending would be illegal. None of Knapp’s individual sentences exceeded the statutory máximums allowed by law. Further, the sentences did not exceed the sentencing guidelines. In my opinion Knapp failed to seek the appropriate appellate avenues she had available to her on a timely basis. Knapp could have filed a timely appeal or could have filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 within two years of the time her eases became final in the trial court. She did neither. I conclude that Knapp’s sentence is not an illegal sentence as defined in King and Davis.
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…e 3.800(a). Although the 1996 comment references our decision in Barber, we interpret the concurrent jurisdiction to include all motions to correct illegal sentences and not just those motions addressing clerical errors. . In Dawson/Knapp v. State, 698 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), over the dissent of Judge Parker, this court corrected an oral/written discrepancy as an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a). In light of Chojnowski v. State, 705 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), there is at least a possibility th…
-
Errol D. Brooks v. State, 768 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…rt as to case number 91-3539, and remand for further proceedings. A claim that the written sentence fails to comport with the court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing is cognizable in a motion to correct illegal sentence. See Dawson/Knapp v. State, 698 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this issue as to case number 91-3635 because the sentencing hearing transcript demonstrates on page twenty-six that the trial court, after making sufficient findings, properly pro […
-
Williams v. State, 744 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…l sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. Williams alleges that his sentences do not conform to the oral pronouncement made at sentencing. Such a claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800 proceeding. See Dawson/Knapp v. State, 698 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The trial court did not attach any record documents which refute Williams’ claim. Therefore, we reverse and remand. On remand the trial court shall review the record and determine whether there is a discrepancy between the oral p…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995)
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- Sellers v. State, 591 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Taylor, 676 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Williams v. State, 676 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)