VLADEMIR MCKEITHAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-07-02
No. 96-01125
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and QUINCE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.
696 So. 2d 489 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that a sentence imposed after probation revocation cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the original offense, even with credit for time served.


Facts & Procedural History

Vlademir McKeithan was sentenced to a probationary split sentence for manslaughter. After violating probation, he was resentenced to twelve years impr…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Vlademir McKeithan challenges the length of his sentence for manslaughter which was imposed following revocation of his probation. Because McKeithan’s sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, we reverse.

McKeithan was charged with manslaughter, a second-degree felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to a probationary split sentence of four years’ imprisonment followed by eleven years’ probation. The maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is fifteen years’ imprisonment. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). Following his prison term and nine months into the probationary period, McKeithan violated the terms of his probation. McKeithan’s probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum by one year. A defendant who is sentenced following a probation violation cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment greater than the term which could originally have been imposed, with credit for time served. Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988); Baker v. State, 676 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). After consideration of the credit applicable here, the maximum sentence the court can impose is eleven years.

We reverse and remand for resentencing since the twelve year sentence imposed exceeds the maximum for this offense.

THREADGILL, A.C.J., and QUINCE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Waterman v. State, 46 So. 3d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
    …redit for time served, the sentence is lawful because the defendant will never serve more than the statutory maximum. Tillman, 693 So. 2d at 628. We acknowledge that, at first glance, it appears we reached a different holding in McKeithan v. State, 696 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). But while we reversed McKeithan’s postrevocation sentence on the basis that the trial court failed to award the proper credit for time served, we did not specify the amount of credit for time served to which McKeithan was entitle…

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