DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, APPELLANT,
v.
THERESA BLAND EDWARDS AND TIRE KINGDOM, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS AS TIRE KINGDOM, APPELLEES
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The Department of Banking and Finance appeals the trial court's amended final judgment that awarded punitive damages entirely to plaintiff Edwards rather than splitting them 65-35 between Edwards and the state, as required by Florida Statute 768.73. The court reversed, holding that the subsequent repeal of the statute did not provide a valid basis to divest the Department of its vested right to the punitive damages award.
The court held that the repeal of section 768.73(2) did not constitute a valid reason for relief under rule 1.540(b) because no substantive change to the statute occurred between when the claim accrued in 1992 and rendition of the original final judgment. The court also held that because the verdict and final judgment awarding the Department a portion of punitive damages were both rendered before the statute's repeal, the award vested subject to appellate review, and the trial court lacked authority to divest the Department of its entitlement after appellate affirmance.
[1] A trial court may grant relief from a final judgment under Rule 1.540(b) for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, but not for a subseque…
[2] A punitive damage award vests at the time of the verdict and final judgment, subject to appellate review, and a subsequent repeal of a statute governing the distribution…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“no substantive change was made to the statute between the time the claim accrued in 1992 and the rendition of the original final judgment. Therefore, we hold that the repeal of section 768.73(2) did not constitute a valid reason for relief under rule 1.540(b).”
Establishes that the subsequent repeal of the statute could not justify amendment of the judgment because the statutory provision was already in effect when the original judgment was entered.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEdwards sued Tire Kingdom for the cost of a replacement tire, alleging fraud and deceit. A jury awarded $5,250 in punitive damages on March 18, 1994, …
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DELL, Judge.
The Department of Banking and Finance (“Department”) appeals from an amended final judgment entered after this court affirmed and issued its mandate in Tire Kingdom, Inc. d/b/a Tire Kingdom, v. Theresa Bland Edwards, 662 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We reverse and remand.
Appellee (“Edwards”) filed suit against Tire Kingdom for the cost of a new replacement tire and punitive damages for alleged fraud and deceit. On March 18, 1994, the jury awarded compensatory damages and also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $5,250.00. The trial court’s final judgment provided:
Pursuant to Florida Statute 768.73, in an award of punitive damages, sixty-five (65%) percent of the award is payable to the claimant and thirty-five (35%) percent of the award is payable to the State of Florida General Revenue Fund. Based upon Florida Statute 768.73, punitive damages shall be payable as follows: $3,412.50 to Plaintiff, THERESA BLAND EDWARDS, and $1,837.50 to State of Florida General Revenue Fund.
After the jury verdict, the Department intervened in the trial court proceedings pursuant to section 768.73(5), Fla. Stat. (1993). Tire Kingdom timely appealed the award of punitive damages. Neither Edwards nor Tire Kingdom challenged the apportionment of the punitive damage award. This court affirmed the final judgment without opinion on October 25,1995, and issued a mandate on November 13, 1995. Thereafter, Edwards filed a motion to amend the judgment. She argued entitlement to the full amount of the punitive damage award due to the repeal of section 768.73(2), Florida Statutes (1993), by operation of law effective July 1, 1995. On January 17, 1996, the trial court granted Edwards’ motion and amended the final judgment to provide her with the full amount of the punitive damage award.
The trial court apparently entered the amended final judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) (1993). Edwards correctly asserts that the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to rule 1.540(b) to consider her motion to amend the final judgment. See Ohio Cas. Group v. Parrish, 350 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1977). However, no substantive change was made to the statute between the time the claim accrued in 1992 and the rendition of the original final judgment.1 Therefore, we hold that the repeal of section 768.73(2) did not constitute a valid reason for relief under rule 1.540(b).
We also hold that because the verdict and final judgment awarding the Department a portion of the punitive damages were both rendered before the repeal of the statute, the award vested subject to appellate review. See Division of Worker’s Comp., Bureau of Crimes Comp. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). After this court affirmed the judgment, in the absence of a valid ground for relief from judgment pursuant to rule 1.540(b), the trial court did not have authority to divest the Department of its entitlement to the punitive damage award.
Accordingly, we reverse the amended final judgment. We remand this cause and direct the trial court to reinstate the original final judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GLICKSTEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . The amendment to section 768.73(2) provided that it “shall take effect [April 8, 1992] and apply to pending cases and causes of action in which a judgment has not been entered.” § 768.73(2)n.l, Fla. Stat. (1992).
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Juno Ocean Walk Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. The N. Cnty. Co., Inc., 157 So. 3d 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…pplemental record by Hargreaves. . Although rule 1.540(b) couches its language in terms of "vacating" a judgment, it also applies to amending a judgment, which was the relief requested in the motion to amend. See Dep’t of Banking & Fin. v. Edwards, 695 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ("[Tjhe trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to rule 1.540(b) to consider her motion to amend the final judgment.”).…
Authorities Cited
- The Ohio Cas. Grp. v. Parrish, 350 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1977)
- Erling Knud Ove Hansen, Jr. v. State, 420 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)