LAUREN DONSKY-LEVINE, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID G. LEVINE AND WHEELER/DEALER, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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In this second appeal of a dissolution action, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part due to the trial court's contradictory and inadequate findings regarding the appreciation value of the husband's business and valuations of the parties' respective businesses. The court remanded for clarification of findings and review of equitable distribution and alimony rulings, and reversed the trial court's partial award of attorney's fees to the wife.
The court reversed the trial court's findings due to contradictions and lack of adequate factual support, remanded for clarification of the business valuations and appreciation value with reference to expert testimony, and reversed the partial award of attorney's fees, concluding the wife was entitled to 100% of her attorney's fees. The court affirmed all other issues raised.
[1] A trial court's judgments may be reversed in part and affirmed in part on appeal.
[2] Contradictory findings by a trial court regarding the appreciation value of a business and the lack of adequate findings as to business valuations can render informed app…
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Identifies the primary deficiency requiring reversal and remand
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis is the second appeal in a dissolution action. The trial court entered a second amended final judgment on remand from the first appeal. The judgme…
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PER CURIAM.
This is the second appeal arising out of the trial court’s deficient judgments in this dissolution action. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
In Donsky-Levine v. Levine, 658 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), we recited a litany of deficiencies in the trial court’s original final judgment, which deficiencies made informed review impractical on several issues. The same problem exists in the second appeal because of the court’s contradictory findings on the appreciation value of husband’s business and the lack of adequate findings as to the valuations of the parties’ respective businesses.
In paragraph seven of the trial court’s second amended final judgment, which was entered upon remand from the first appeal, the court specifically found that the appreciation value of husband’s business during the duration of the marriage was $88,000. However, the court then went on to recite in paragraph twenty-four that one of the experts had testified that husband’s business had appreciated $200,000 during the time frame when the parties were married. Thereafter, in paragraph twenty-five, the court specifically found that husband’s business had decreased in value.
On remand, the trial court is to clarify its findings as to the appreciation value of husband’s business during the duration of the marriage, and reference the expert testimony upon which its valuation relies. It is further directed to clearly set forth its valuations on the businesses of the respective parties, and the evidence relied upon in valuing the businesses.
In light of the clarified findings which the trial court is to make, it is further directed to review and, if warranted, modify its rulings, particularly those on equitable distribution and alimony as set forth in paragraphs six, seven and twenty-seven of the second amended final judgment.
Prior to this appeal, the wife was represented by an attorney. We further conclude that she was entitled to 100% of her attorney’s fees and reverse the award of only partial fees to her. We affirm as to all other issues raised.
GLICKSTEIN, DELL and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.