HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PETITIONER,
v.
GENORVAL SLAY, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that when a defendant is resentenced after violating probation on a pre-1989 split sentence, a trial court's award of "credit for all time served" is sufficient to include both time actually served and unforfeited gain-time earned during the original incarceration, as required by State v. Green.
Yes. A sentencing court's order awarding "credit for all time previously served in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing" must be interpreted to include unforfeited gain-time earned during the original incarceration, and the Department of Corrections is obligated to provide such credit.
[1] A sentencing court's award of credit for "all time previously served" on a count in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing, when the defendant is resentenced…
[2] In the absence of language to the contrary, a sentencing judge's order granting credit for all time previously served in the Department of Corrections prior to resentenci…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in the absence of language to the contrary, it must be assumed that the sentencing judge's order that Forbes 'be allowed credit for all time previously served ... in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing' contemplated that Forbes should receive credit for unforfeited gain time.”
Establishes the interpretive principle that standard sentencing language includes gain-time credit
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGenorval Slay violated probation after serving the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence for a pre-October 1, 1989 crime. At resentenci…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We accepted jurisdiction to answer the following question certified to be of great public importance:
WHEN A DEFENDANT IS RESEN-TENCED AFTER VIOLATING THE PROBATIONARY PORTION OF A SPLIT SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR A CRIME OCCURRING PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1989, IS THE SENTENCING COURT’S AWARD OF “CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED ON THIS COUNT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PRIOR TO RESENTENCING” SUFFICIENT TO EFFECT THE AWARD OF CREDIT FOR TIME ACTUALLY SERVED AS WELL AS UN-FORFEITED GAIN-TIME TO WHICH AN ENTITLEMENT EXISTS UNDER STATE V. GREEN, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989)?
Id. at 457-58. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Respondent Genorval Slay violated his probation after' serving the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence. 676 So. 2d at 457. On resentencing, the trial court used the standard form provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986 and awarded “credit for all time previously served on this count in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing.” Id. Slay subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that the Department of Corrections (DOC) failed to allow him credit for gain time awarded during the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence. After the petition was denied, Slay appealed to the First District which vacated the trial court’s order denying Slay’s petition, reasoning that the sentencing provision in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.986 allows “the defendant credit for time actually served as well as earned gain time to which an entitlement exists under Green.” Id.
We recently addressed this precise issue in Forbes v. Singletary, 684 So. 2d 173 (Fla.1996).2 In Forbes, we explained that “in the absence of language to the contrary, it must be assumed that the sentencing judge’s order that Forbes ‘be allowed credit for all time previously served ... in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing’ contemplated that Forbes should receive credit for unforfeited gain time.” Id. at 173 (footnote omitted). Consequently, we found that DOC was obligated under Green to interpret the defendant’s sentencing order as including unforfeited gain time. Id. By our ruling, we concluded that “DOC is also obligated to provide appropriate credit to others who are in the same position as Forbes.” Id. at 174 n. 3. Thus, Slay is entitled to credit for gain time earned during the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence.
Accordingly, on the authority of Forbes, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision under review.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. . In State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla. 1989), we held that criminal defendants are entitled to "include earned gain-time when computing time served to credit against the sentence imposed after revocation of probation which is part of a probationary split sentence.”
. The court in Forbes used the sentencing form provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986, id., as did the sentencing court in Slay.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Rabedeau, 2 So. 3d 191 (Fla. 2009)…ed to five years of prison term credit on each of the three counts. Bound by the Gisi decision, the trial court denied Rabe-deau’s motion. Rabedeau, 971 So. 2d at 914. The Fifth District, relying on the decisions and opinions in Singletary v. Slay, 688 So. 2d 319 (Fla.1997); Turner v. State, 967 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); and Swain v. State, 845 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), reversed the trial court’s decision and held that Rabedeau was entitled to credit for time served on his concurrent sentences in…
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Shamus D. Layman v. State, 787 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…not grant him credit for time previously served in the DOC on these same charges. Upon violating the probationary portion of a split sentence, the defendant is entitled to credit for time served on the incareerative portion. See Singletary v. Slay, 688 So. 2d 319 (Fla.1997); Steele v. State 733 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Thus, we reverse the denial of Layman’s motion and remand for the trial court to check the prison credit provision on Layman’s sentence so that, in addition to the 101 days of jail cre…
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Wyon Dale Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…95),] and to the extent prior cases ... are read to suggest that a sentencing court must do more in order to effect a full award of Green credit[, referring to State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989)], we recede from those opinions.”), approved by 688 So. 2d 319 (Fla.1997); Jenkins v. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 618 So. 2d 749, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“In making this determination, we recede from Cook [v. Division of Personnel, Department of Administration, 356 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)],…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989)
- Forbes v. Singletary, 684 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1996)
- Genorval Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)