SOUTHEAST MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS OF TAMPA, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
M.A. MORTENSON CO., A MINNESOTA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Southeast Mechanical Contractors appealed an order it characterized as granting relief from judgment, but the court dismissed the appeal as premature because the underlying order was neither final nor appealable. The trial court's grant of summary judgment on an indemnity clause enforcement claim did not constitute an appealable order and did not qualify as a partial final judgment under Florida law.
The order is neither final nor appealable. It does not qualify as an appealable partial final judgment because it does not constitute a third-party declaratory judgment resolving a separable third-party action, enters no final monetary judgment, contains no mandatory injunction language, and does not clearly resolve an issue of liability.
[1] An order that attempts to extend the time to appeal a prior non-appealable order is neither a final nor an appealable nonfinal order.
[2] A trial court's order granting summary judgment on an indemnity clause is not appealable as a partial final judgment if it does not enter a final monetary judgment or con…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The order on appeal, described as an order granting relief from judgment, is neither a final nor an appealable nonfinal order. The order grants no relief from any final judgment, but attempts to extend the time to appeal a prior order that granted summary judgment.”
Establishes the core holding that the order lacks appellate jurisdiction and does not constitute a final or appealable nonfinal order.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMadelyn Warcholik sued various defendants, including general contractor M.A. Mortenson Company, for respiratory illness allegedly caused by constructi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Indemnification Clause Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
ALTENBERND, Judge.
The order on appeal, described as an order granting relief from judgment, is neither a final nor an appealable nonfinal order. The order grants no relief from any final judg ment, but attempts to extend the time to appeal a prior order that granted summary judgment. The order granting summary judgment was not appealable when it was entered. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
Madelyn Warcholik sued various defendants, including M.A. Mortenson Company (Mortenson), alleging that she developed a respiratory illness because of defects in the construction of a building. Mortenson was the general contractor who constructed the building. Southeast Mechanical Contractors of Tampa, Inc. (Southeast), was the subcontractor responsible for the heating, air conditioning, and ventilation system. Southeast’s contract with Mortenson contained an indemnity clause, requiring it to both defend and indemnify Mortenson for certain claims.
After Ms. Warcholik filed her lawsuit, Mortenson filed a third-party complaint against Southeast, one count of which sought to enforce the indemnity clause. In granting summary judgment, the trial court essentially has decided that the clause is enforceable and applies to Ms. Warcholik’s suit. The trial court’s order, however, is not a third-party declaratory judgment, which would be appealable as a partial final judgment resolving the issues presented in a separable third-party action. Canal Insurance Co. v. Reed, 666 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1996). Although it explains that Southeast should reimburse Mor-tenson for prior legal expenses incurred in defending Ms. Warcholik’s claim, the order enters no final monetary judgment. This nonfinal order contains no language in the nature of a mandatory injunction requiring Southeast to provide legal representation to Mortenson. Further, the order does not clearly resolve an issue of liability. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Querns, 562 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Although it appears that the trial court can enter an appealable partial final judgment as was done in Canal, no such order has been rendered in this case. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Nat'l Assurance Underwriters, Inc. v. Kelley, 702 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…(Emphasis supplied). The rule, by its clear and unambiguous terms, is limited to “judgments.” An order denying summary judgment is not, by any stretch, a “judgment.”1 See also Southeast Mechanical Contractors of Tampa, Inc. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 685 So. 2d 1316, (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Essentially, the purpose of the rule is to allow an appellant to take advantage of the more expeditious review provided for non-final orders. The purpose of rule 9.110(n) is not to expand the types of non-final orders that are r…
-
Farmland Hydro, L.P. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 765 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), and there is no other basis for this court’s jurisdiction. See Southeast Mechanical Contractors of Tampa, Inc. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 685 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that summary judgment order determining an indemnity issue on a third-party complaint was not appealable as a nonfinal order when it was entered). Therefore, the propriety of the summary judgment must wait to be addressed…
-
Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Aviation Off. OF Am., 826 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ling is to grant or deny what amounts to specific performance of the duty to defend, then such an order should be immediately reviewable as an order granting or denying an injunction. Southeast Mech. Contractors of Tampa, Inc. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 685 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).1 The County’s lawsuit against the insurers in this case alleges that the insurers must indemnify the County for pollution damage at the airport. As to the duty to defend, the County requests damages for failure of the insu…
Authorities Cited
- Canal Ins. Co. v. Reed, 666 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1996)
- Ins. Co. OF N. Am. v. Querns, 562 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)