LINDA ALLBRITTON, APPELLANT,

v.

LAMONT STAHLMAN, APPELLEE

PER CURIAM.

Linda Allbritton appeals the denial of her motion to set aside a final judgment. We reverse because Allbritton was never served with the complaint and did not otherwise submit herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, the final judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction and should have been set aside.

The underlying lawsuit was originally filed against Allbritton’s husband and son. At the pretrial conference, the plaintiff requested leave to add Allbritton as a defendant. The pretrial conference order granted that request and stated that the attorney of record for Allbritton’s husband would file an answer for Allbritton within ten days of receiving the third amended complaint.

It is undisputed that no service of process was ever made on Allbritton. The attorney for Allbritton’s husband filed an answer and affirmative defenses on Allbritton’s behalf. Eventually a trial was held and a final judgment was entered against the defendants, including Allbritton. Allbritton did not personally appear or participate in any of these proceedings.

Later, when the plaintiff personally served her with a motion for proceedings supplementary, Allbritton filed a motion to set aside the final judgment. At a hearing on the motion, Allbritton testified that she had never been served with the complaint naming her as a defendant, that she was never represented by an attorney in the case, and that she was not aware that she was a party in the case. She also testified that she had never met the attorney representing her husband and had never authorized him to represent her. The attorney submitted an affidavit and acknowledged that he had never spoken with Allbritton and had never received her authorization to represent her in the case.

The trial court denied Allbritton’s motion to set aside the final judgment. We reverse because the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Allbritton. The appellee argues that the court obtained jurisdiction over Allbritton when her husband’s attorney filed an answer and affirmative defenses on her behalf. However, the attorney who filed pleadings on her behalf and purported to represent her in the lawsuit had never spoken to Allbritton and was not authorized by Allbritton to represent her in the lawsuit. While there may be a presumption that an attorney is authorized to act for a client whom he professes to represent, see Mendelsund, v. Southern-Aire Coats of Fla., 210 So. 2d 229, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), that presumption was overcome in this case by the testimony of both Allbrit-ton and the attorney which clearly established that Allbritton never authorized the attorney to represent her and was unaware of his representation. Therefore, the attorney’s purported appearance on her behalf did not subject her to the jurisdiction of the court. Because she was never served with process and did not otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, the final judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Totalbank, 472 So. 2d 861, 864-65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

The case is reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Allbritton’s motion to set aside the final judgment against her. FULMER and QUINCE, JJ., concur. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., concurs specially.

ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge,

concurring.

I concur in the result in this ease with great reluctance. In my opinion, the judgment against Linda Allbritton was not void, but voidable. See Great American Ins. Co. v. Bevis, 652 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (Altenbemd, J., dissenting). Because of the presumption that her attorney of record was authorized to represent her, I believe the judgment was valid until she presented evidence to overcome the presumption. If the trial judge had ruled against Mrs. Allbritton because he did not find her testimony credible, I would affirm that decision. In this case, the law severely penalizes a plaintiff for trusting the word of defense counsel. Mr. Stahlman should not be without an adequate remedy for his reasonable reliance under these circumstances.

This case arises out of a dispute among investors in a used car dealership. Arthur M. Allbritton and Linda Allbritton are husband and wife and are listed as jointly owning 50% of the relevant partnership or limited liability company. Their son, Michael Allbritton, held a state license to operate the business. Mr. Stahlman invested in the business and owned a 25% share. Mr. Stahlman named only Arthur M. Allbritton as a defendant in his original complaint. Interestingly, the record contains a representation by the plaintiffs attorney that the initial service of process was accomplished by substituted service on Mrs. Allbritton. Thus, she knew that her husband had been sued for his activities in a partnership in which she held a 50% joint ownership. Attorney Robert A. Meade, Jr., filed an answer to this lawsuit on behalf of Arthur Allbritton.

Following discovery, the plaintiffs attorneys concluded that Mrs. Allbritton needed to be joined as a defendant in this action. An affidavit from one of the plaintiffs attorneys states that he discussed with Mr. Meade the need to join Mrs. Allbritton in this action and that Mr. Meade agreed to accept service on her behalf. The pretrial conference order expressly allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint and provided that Mr. Meade would file an answer on behalf of both Arthur and Linda Allbritton. Mr. Meade filed no objection to this order. He filed an answer on behalf of Mrs. Allbritton that did not raise any defense concerning jurisdiction or service of process. Thereafter, he represented Mr. and Mrs. Allbritton at trial. The court entered a judgment against the couple for $31,793.26 on December 19,1994.

The plaintiff filed proceedings supplementary to collect on the judgment in April 1995. In May, Mrs. Allbritton filed a motion objecting on grounds that she was never served with process and had never authorized Mr. Meade to represent her. Her affidavit states that she was unaware of the judgment until the proceedings supplementary. Mr. Meade testified that he had never met Mrs. Allbrit-ton and had filed an answer on authority given to him by Arthur Allbritton. Apparently, she played no role in the earlier trial.

I can understand why Mrs. Allbritton is upset that her husband’s attorney acted on her behalf without her authorization. On the other hand, both the trial judge and the plaintiffs attorney had no reason to distrust the actions of Mr. Meade as an officer of the court. Had the plaintiff known that Mrs. Allbritton required service of process, that step could have been easily accomplished pri-or to the trial. Now Mr. Stahlman does not have a joint and several judgment against the Allbrittons. If he ultimately obtains such a judgment, he will have incurred additional expenses, and the judgment may be inferior to other judgments. I do not regret giving Mrs. Allbritton due process; I regret penalizing a party whose only mistake was trusting an officer of the court.