J.R. AND A.R., PETITIONERS,
v.
R.M. AND S.M., GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, RESPONDENTS
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Approved adoptive parents sought to intervene in a pending adoption proceeding filed by foster parents for the same minor child. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to intervene, holding that the approved adoptive parents had a direct and immediate legal interest sufficient to establish standing under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280.
Approved adoptive parents have a direct and immediate legal interest sufficient to establish standing to intervene in a pending adoption proceeding. Their interests would be directly and adversely affected by the outcome of the foster parents' adoption petition, satisfying the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280.
[1] A trial court errs in denying a motion to intervene when the movant demonstrates a direct and immediate interest in the pending litigation that will be adversely affected…
[2] Approved prospective adoptive parents have a direct and immediate interest in an adoption proceeding that entitles them to intervene.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a right by intervention.”
The governing standard for intervention under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners J.R. and A.M. were approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) as adoptive parents for a minor child. Three sib…
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PARIENTE, Judge.
Petitioners, who have been approved as the adoptive parents of the minor child by HRS, filed a petition for certiorari. They challenge the denial of their motions to intervene in the adoption proceeding filed by the foster parents or to consolidate the foster parents’ adoption petition with their own. Petitioners’ adoption petition was transferred to the judge presiding over the foster parents’ adoption proceeding so that both peti tions will be heard by the same judge. In light of this transfer, which eliminates the risk of inconsistent rulings, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law in the trial court’s denial of the motion to consolidate. See Pages v. Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
As to that portion of the order denying petitioners’ motion to intervene, we reverse.1 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280 provides that “[ajnyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a right by intervention. ...” Our supreme court in Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla.1996), discussed the general application of rule 1.230 to requests for intervention in an adoption proceeding:
Generally, the interest which entitles a person to intervene must be shown to be in the matter in litigation. The interest must be direct and immediate and the intervenor must show that he or she will gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. A showing of indirect, inconsequential or contingent interest is wholly inadequate.
Applying these principles, our supreme court held that a parent whose parental rights have been terminated lacks the legal interest necessary to establish standing to intervene and contest the adoption of his or her child. Id.
Petitioners, on the other hand, have been approved as the adoptive parents by HRS for this minor child. The minor child’s three siblings already reside with petitioners, who have initiated proceedings to adopt not only the minor child, but his three siblings as well. Petitioners’ interest is direct and immediate; their interests would be directly and adversely affected by the outcome of the foster parents’ pending adoption proceeding.
In an analogous situation, C.S. v. S.H., 671 So. 2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), this court held that relatives, who were the approved adoptive parents, were properly granted leave to intervene. We see no significant factors which would distinguish this case from C.S. with regard to the issue of intervention. The trial court here could have consolidated the two pending adoption proceedings, but once it chose not to, the trial court erred in denying petitioners’ motion to intervene. See Citibank, N. A v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 So. 2d 984, 986-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
STONE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. . While this case was filed as a certiorari petition, we redesignate that portion of the petition seeking review of the order denying intervention as a plenary appeal, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c). See City of Dania v. Broward County, 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
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Y.H. v. F.L.H. and K.W.H., 784 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1989). See also Dillon v. Robb, 597 So. 2d 891, 894-95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (Harris, J., dissenting). Nor does she claim that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had approved her as an adoptive parent. Cf. J.R. v. R.M., 679 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); C.S. v. S.H., 671 So. 2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (approving trial court’s permitting “blood relatives ap [*573] proved as adoptive parents by HRS” to intervene in adoption proceedings that foster parents had initiated i…1 / 2
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Superior Fence & Rail OF N. Fla. v. Lucas, 35 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…n order denying a motion to intervene is appealable as a matter of right, by plenary appeal, because the order constitutes a final determination of the proceeding as to the parties seeking to intervene. In re S.N.W., 912 So. 2d at 370; J.R. v. R.M., 679 So. 2d 64, 65 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also City of Dania v. Broward County, 658 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Citibank N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We recede from our prior case law holding th…
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Smith v. Chepolis, 896 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…ppeal in all circumstances. In some situations, the right to appeal extends to a nonparty. For example, a litigant who is denied the right to intervene may appeal the order [*936] denying intervention even though he is not a party. See J.R. v. R.M., 679 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); City of Dania v. Broward County, 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). An order denying a right to intervene directly adjudicates the legal rights of the prospective intervenor. This case presents a different situation, but the a…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- C.S. and J.S. v. S.H. and K.H., 671 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1996)
- Badger v. State, 398 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Modernized Trucking, Inc. v. The Lowell Dunn Co., 652 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- City OF Dania v. Broward Cnty., 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)