MELLISH ENTERPRISES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND WEATHERFORD U.S., INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Mellish Enterprises appealed the dismissal of its indemnification claim against Weatherford International, seeking recovery for a judgment entered against it. The court reversed, holding that Mellish adequately pleaded an indemnification cause of action and that payment of the judgment is not a prerequisite to bringing such an action.
Mellish's complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for indemnification. The trial court erred by considering matters outside the four corners of the complaint and by requiring payment of the judgment as a prerequisite to the indemnification action. The entry of judgment, not payment, provides the prerequisite for an indemnification action.
[1] A trial court errs when it considers matters outside the four corners of a complaint.
[2] Payment of a judgment is not a prerequisite for stating a cause of action for indemnification; the entry of a judgment is sufficient.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The entry of a judgment provides the prerequisite for an indemnification action, not payment of the judgment.”
Establishes that the entry of judgment is sufficient to proceed with indemnification claims without requiring prior payment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMellish Enterprises filed a complaint seeking indemnification for a judgment entered against it in the amount of $1,834,279.50. The trial court dismis…
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DELL, Judge.
Mellish Enterprises, Inc., a Florida corporation, filed a complaint against appellees seeking indemnification for a judgment entered against it in the amount of $1,834,-279.50. Mellish contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that its action was barred by a release between appellees and the third party, res judicata and because' Mellish had not paid the judgment.
The record supports appellant’s argument that the trial court erred when it considered matters outside the four corners of the complaint. E.g., Reed v. Sampson, 349 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). See also Sovran Equity Mortgage Corp. v. Parsons, 547 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Eugene v. Prestcon, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The trial court also erroneously concluded that Mellish had to allege payment of the judgment in order to state a cause of action for indemnification. The entry of a judgment provides the prerequisite for an indemnification action, not payment of the judgment. See Flagship Nat’l Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
In Julien P. Benjamin Equipment Co. v. Blackwell Burner Co., 450 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), a third party sued a distributor alleging damages as a result of a defective product. The trial court dismissed the distributor’s action against the manufacturer for indemnification. In reversing the trial court’s order of dismissal, the Third District Court of Appeal held:
[N]either the manufacturer’s settlement of a prior action brought against it by the same plaintiff, nor the fact that the plaintiffs complaint in this case alleges only active negligence by the distributor, precludes the maintenance of the indemnity claim on the presently asserted ground that the distributor’s liability, if any, arises only vicariously for a defect created in the product by the manufacturer. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Based on Benjamin, we hold that Mellish’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of appellant’s complaint for indemnification and remand this ease for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Reed v. Sampson, 349 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Parsons, 547 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Julien P. Benjamin Equip. Co. v. Blackwell Burner Co., 450 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Wilfranc Eugene and Marie L. Eugene v. Prestcon, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)