ROBERT PETERSON AND LIV RANDI PETERSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, AS RECEIVER OF SOUTHEAST BANK, N.A., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1996-07-17
Nos. 96-225, 95-1941, 95-2677
Before COPE, LEVY and FLETCHER, JJ.
678 So. 2d 843 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Mfirmed. See Obanion v. State, 496 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.1987); see also Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 691 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996).


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Cited By

  • State v. Burns, 698 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 824-25 (Fla. 1981). Nonetheless, both Terry and section 901.151 suggest that a pat-down for weapons requires something more than the well-founded suspicion of criminal activity justifying the detention. See Stalling v. State, 678 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (under Terry and section 901.151, more than reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is required before officer may conduct pat-down searches); Hamilton (officer’s knowledge that cocaine dealers usually carry weapons insuff…
  • Sedrick Everette v. State, 736 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …luded the patdown was justified for officer safety. Of course, the reason officers conduct a patdown is to defuse the risk an armed detainee poses, but their safety concerns must arise from some specific articulable suspicion. See Stalling v. State, 678 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Here, the officer reasoned from a generalized conclusion: where there are drugs, there are also often weapons. There was no testimony that this defendant had been known to possess a weapon in the past or was suspected of possess…
  • Copeland v. State, 717 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
    …reach the issue of whether the Deputy’s action was justified at its inception, i.e., whether he had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, because more is required before he could conduct the frisk or search. See Stalling v. State, 678 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The standard for evaluating the reasonableness of a frisk is whether the officers were justified in believing that the suspect was armed and dangerous.” State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981)(holding that what is re…

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