DARWIN D. PATTERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1996-08-06
No. 95-4497
ALLEN, WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
677 So. 2d 961 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Darwin Patterson appeals the summary denial of his post-conviction motion challenging his habitual offender sentence, alleging he was not informed of the collateral consequences of the sentence, specifically loss of gain time. The court finds merit in Patterson's claim under the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Wilson and reverses the habitual offender designation.


Holding

The court held that Patterson's habitual offender sentence must be vacated because the record does not show Patterson knew he would be ineligible for gain time as a result of his plea. Under State v. Wilson, the sentencing court must confirm that the defendant knew of the maximum habitual offender term and ineligibility for programs affecting early release before imposing such a sentence.


Headnotes

[1] A motion for post-conviction relief is timely if filed within the applicable statutory period.

[2] A defendant pleading nolo contendere cannot be designated an habitual offender if the sentencing court fails to confirm the defendant knew of the maximum habitual offende…

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Key Quotes

“where the sentencing court fails "to confirm that [the defendant] knew of the maximum habitual offender term for the charged offense and that he could be ineligible for certain programs affecting early release," a defendant pleading nolo contendere cannot be designated an habitual offender.”

Establishes the legal requirement for valid habitual offender sentencing following a no contest plea

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Facts & Procedural History

Patterson pleaded no contest to grand theft auto in December 1993 in Escambia County. He was sentenced on April 27, 1994, as a habitual offender to se…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Darwin D. Patterson (Patterson) appeals the summary denial of his pro se motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse.

Patterson filed the instant motion for post-conviction relief, his first, on February 15, 1995. Patterson pleaded no contest to grand theft auto; he committed this crime sometime in December 1993, in Escambia County. Patterson was sentenced on April 27, 1994, as an habitual offender, to seven and one-half years in prison; he did not directly appeal. The instant motion thus is timely. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b).

Patterson alleges that he did not know the “exact collateral consequences of the habitual offender sentence,” specifically, that “he would lose gain time.” The Florida Supreme Court tells us that, where the sentencing court fails “to confirm that [the defendant] knew of the maximum habitual offender term for the charged offense and that he could be ineligible for certain programs affecting early release,” a defendant pleading nolo contendere cannot be designated an habitual offender. State v. Wilson, 658 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla.1995). Nothing in the record before us shows that Patterson knew that he would be ineligible for gain time as a result of his plea.

Patterson next maintains that he should be sentenced pursuant to the guidelines. This argument is without merit. Id. The State never agreed to the sentence imposed upon Patterson, and all parties understood that the State was seeking habitualization. The Wilson court tells us:

Under these circumstances it would be unfair to the State to remand for resentencing within the terms of [the defendant’s plea petition. Allowing [the defen dant] to withdraw his plea, on the other hand, prejudices no one — it returns the players to square one, the same position they were in before the court erred.

Id. at 523.

We therefore vacate the habitual offender sentence and remand for resentencing. Patterson, at resentencing, should be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial if he so desires. Should he plead nolo or guilty, the court may in its discretion sentence him under the guidelines or impose an habitual offender term so long as the requirements of Wilson are met.

ALLEN, WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Rainey v. State, 741 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …e trial court should afford the State the opportunity to decide whether the case is appropriate for plea negotiations under the sentencing guidelines or should proceed to trial. Akins v. State, 691 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Patterson v. State, 677 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Williams, 650 So. 2d at 1055. We VACATE the habitual felony offender sentence and REMAND for further proceedings. MINER and BENTON, JJ., concur.…
  • Golden v. State, 703 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    …sentencing court failed to confirm that he knew of maximum habitual offender term and that he knew of his ineligibility for certain programs affecting early release); Horton v. State, 682 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); and Patterson v. State, 677 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), we are constrained to reverse the order as to Ground One. We remand the cause to the trial court for attachment of portions of the record that conclusively refute the allegations in the first claim, or, if no such parts of the r…
  • Carpenter v. State, 740 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …rial court may exercise its discretion to sentence him under the guidelines or impose an enhanced term pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes, so long as the requirements of State v. Wilson, 658 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1995), and Patterson v. State, 677 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), are met. AFFIRMING in part, REVERSING in part, and REMANDING for attachments or further proceedings. BARFIELD, C.J., and LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR.…

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