TORACE JONES AND CHARLIE GASPER, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Two Black appellants challenged their sentences as habitual offenders, arguing the state attorney's decision to seek such enhancement was racially motivated. The court affirmed their sentences, holding that statistical evidence of racial disparities in sentencing is insufficient; appellants must instead prove purposeful discrimination in their individual cases.
Appellants are not entitled to relief based on statistical disparities alone. A defendant seeking to challenge a sentencing decision as racially discriminatory must prove that the decision-maker acted with discriminatory purpose in the defendant's specific case, not merely present general statistical analyses showing racial patterns in sentencing.
[1] A defendant seeking to set aside a sentence based on alleged racial motivation in the prosecutor's decision to seek habitual offender treatment must prove that the decisi…
[2] General statistical analyses alone are insufficient to establish purposeful discrimination in sentencing decisions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant must prove that the decision-maker acted with a discriminatory purpose in his or her case to be entitled to relief of the type appellants seek here — general statistical analyses are unavailing”
Establishes the governing legal standard that individual proof of discriminatory purpose is required, not statistical disparities
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones and Gasper, both Black defendants, were sentenced as habitual offenders in the Second Judicial Circuit. They presented statistical analysis alle…
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PER CURIAM.
In these two consolidated appeals, appellants seek review of their sentences, Jones as an habitual violent felony offender, and Gas-per as an habitual felony offender. Both assert that they are entitled to have their sentences set aside, and to be resentenced pursuant to the guidelines, because the state attorney’s decision to request habitual offender treatment was racially motivated. We affirm.
In the trial court, appellants, who are black, relied principally on a statistical analysis which, according to them, established that, in the Second Judicial Circuit, blacks were being sentenced as habitual offenders some three times more frequently than were supposedly similarly situated whites. In a well-reasoned order, the trial court found that the analysis was flawed in significant respects. It is unnecessary to address the structure and validity of the analysis because the trial court also found that the evidence presented by appellants failed to establish that the state attorney had acted with a discriminatory purpose in their cases — i.e., that the decision to seek habitual offender treatment in their cases was motivated by racial prejudice. Because it concluded that proof of such intent was a necessary prerequisite to such a claim, it denied relief. We believe that the trial court applied the correct legal test, and that its finding of a lack of proof of such intent is clearly supported by the record.
The United States and Florida Supreme Courts have both held that a defendant must prove that the decision-maker acted with a discriminatory purpose in his or her case to be entitled to relief of the type appellants seek here — general statistical analyses are unavailing. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (denying challenge to Georgia death sentencing procedure as unconstitutional because statistical analysis indicated that race was a factor in sentencing decisions); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 463 (Fla.1992) (claim that state attorney based decision to seek death penalty on racial considerations legally insufficient absent proof “that the state attorney’s office acted with purposeful discrimination in seeking the death penalty in his case”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 951, 114 S.Ct. 398, 126 L.Ed.2d 346 (1993).
Relying on these precedents, the district courts of appeal of this state have consistently held that statistical disparities are not probative in establishing that the habitual offender statute is being applied in a racially discriminatory manner, and that a defendant must prove that he or she was subjected to purposeful discrimination based on race to establish such a claim. E.g., Bartley v. State, 657 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Miller v. State, 651 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.1995); McKinley v. State, 650 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Hartley v. State, 650 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Pittman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 642 So. 2d 747 (Fla.1994).
We have found nothing in appellants’ arguments to persuade us to recede from this requirement.
Accordingly, appellants’ sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
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Brooks v. State, 676 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…motivated; and as to the latter, he asserts that the costs imposed should be stricken because he was not afforded “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” We affirm appellant’s habitual felony offender sentences on the authority of Jones v. State, 676 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We affirm also the imposition of $50.00 in costs pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund), and $3.00 pursuant to section 943.25(3), Florida Statutes (for the Additional Court Cost Cle…
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Rickie Renoried Mathis v. State, 675 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…THOSE OF SIMILARLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS WHOSE CASES WERE PENDING ON DIRECT APPEAL OR OTHERWISE NOT YET FINAL WHEN THE OPINION WAS RELEASED? Finally, we affirm appellant’s habitual violent felony offender sentence on the authority of Jones v. State, 676 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). AFFIRMED. WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.…
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White v. State, 676 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…PER CURIAM. This cause is before us on Appellee’s motion for rehearing. We grant the motion for rehearing and, accordingly, withdraw our former opinion of October 10, 1995, and substitute the following in lieu thereof. AFFIRMED. Jones v. State, 676 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stubbs v. State, 673 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (general division, en banc). BOOTH, JOANOS and BENTON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- McCLESKEY v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1987)
- Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992)
- Stanford Lamar v. State, 650 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Pittman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Parsons v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)
- Richards v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 510 U.S. 951 (U.S. 1993)
- Beavers v. Texas, 510 U.S. 951 (U.S. 1993)
- Miller v. State, 651 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Edwards v. State, 650 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- McKINLEY v. State, 650 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)