MICHAEL D. JONES, P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
SEMINOLE COUNTY, ETC., APPELLEE
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Michael Jones, P.A., a law firm, challenged the constitutionality of Florida's Chapter 162 code enforcement statute, arguing it created an unconstitutional "rogue" judicial system that violated Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution. The court affirmed summary judgment against Jones, finding that code enforcement boards exercise quasi-judicial rather than judicial powers and do not violate the state constitution.
Chapter 162 does not violate the Florida Constitution. Code enforcement boards exercise quasi-judicial powers, not judicial powers, as they may impose fines but not criminal penalties, provide notice and hearing with a record, and allow appeals, though not de novo.
[1] Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, which grants powers to code enforcement boards, does not violate Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution by establishing a "…
[2] Code enforcement boards possess quasi-judicial powers, not judicial powers, as they can impose fines and assert liens but cannot impose criminal penalties.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The powers given by the Legislature to code enforcement boards by Chapter 162 do not appear to us as having crossed the line between "quasi-judicial" and "judicial."”
The court's central holding distinguishing code enforcement boards from actual judicial bodies, establishing they exercise quasi-judicial rather than judicial power.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones refused to obtain an occupational license for his law practice in Seminole County as required by the county tax collector. After Jones failed to…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*96] W. SHARP, Judge.
Michael Jones, P.A., a law firm owned by Jones, appeals fi’om a final summary judgment, which denied its application for a declaratory judgment holding that Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, violates Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution by establishing a “rogue” judicial system.
This proceeding had its origin when Jones rejected the Seminole County tax collector’s assertion and notice that he was required to obtain and pay for an occupational license for his law business, located in that county. When he failed to do so, Jones was given notice of a hearing before the Code Enforcement Board, which was continued at his request. Following a second notice and hearing, which Jones did not attend, the Board found Jones in violation. The Board scheduled a hearing to consider imposition of fines. This hearing was not held before Jones filed his lawsuit.
The powers given by the Legislature to code enforcement boards by Chapter 162 do not appear to us as having crossed the line between “quasi-judicial” and “judicial.” Such boards may impose fines for code violations but they cannot impose criminal penalties. Although boards can assert a lien against real or personal property,1 presumably section 162.09 would be interpreted to permit the presentment of defenses prior to enforcement of any lien.2 Further, the statute provides for the fundamental due process requirements of notice and a hearing, making of a record, and appeal, although such an appeal is not de novo.
We are not unsympathetic to Jones’ argument (based on newspaper accounts and Jones’ description of hearings before other boards, which Jones cites in this case) that some boards take unbridled and arbitrary actions, and may well deserve Jones’ characterization of them as “kangaroo courts.” Deprivation of an individual’s due process rights, as these accounts indicate may have happened, can be addressed and remedied by a court in a proper ease. But this is not that case.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, C.J., and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . § 162.09, Fla.Stat. (1993).
. See State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla.1990).
.§§ 162.06; 162.07; 162.11, Fla.Stat. (1993).
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Massey v. Charlotte Cnty., 842 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…noted, “It is necessary to fill the procedural gaps in [chapter 162] by the common-sense application of basic principles of due process.” City of Tampa v. Brown, 711 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (stating, “[a]l-though [code enforcement] boards can assert a lien against real or personal property, presumably section 162.09 would be interpreted to permit the presentment of [*146] defenses prior to enforcement of any lie…
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Emil P. Verdi, Jr. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 684 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…de County Circuit Court. Section 8CC-8. Given the nature of these proceedings, we can only conclude that they fall squarely within the parameters of a constitutionally authorized quasi-judicial proceeding. Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Transgulf Pipeline Co./Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Bd. of County Comm’rs., 438 So. 2d 876, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“[T]he use of a hearing officer to conduct a hearing and make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Jed Pittman v. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990)