MYRA SUE STAMMERS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
BADEN STAMMERS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's equitable distribution judgment for failure to identify and value marital assets as required by Florida law, while affirming other aspects of the judgment including the denial of alimony.
The trial court erred in failing to identify and value marital assets, and the case must be remanded for the trial court to value the assets on which testimony was taken and to clarify the temporary alimony arrearage. The challenge to the attorney's fees award was dismissed as not ripe for review. The denial of alimony was affirmed.
[1] A trial court must identify and value marital assets for purposes of equitable distribution in a dissolution judgment.
[2] A final judgment of dissolution may be reversed for failing to account for assets for which testimony was taken.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Without knowing what value the trial court assigned to the assets it found were marital assets, a meaningful evaluation of the equitable distribution plan devised by the trial court cannot be made.”
Establishes the fundamental deficiency requiring reversal—lack of asset valuation prevents appellate review of the equitable distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMyra Sue Stammers and Baden Stammers were parties to a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court made findings regarding marital assets but …
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PER CURIAM.
The wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution. She complains that the trial court erred by failing to follow the requirements of section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes (1991), which requires the court to identify and value the assets of the marriage for purposes of equitable distribution. We agree and reverse. Without knowing what value the trial court assigned to the assets it found were marital assets, a meaningful evaluation of the equitable distribution plan devised by the trial court cannot be made. Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
We do not mean to suggest by our reversal that the trial court is required to value the assets which the parties withdrew from consideration by the trial court. Nevertheless, there are assets in the record on which testimony was taken that are not accounted for in the final judgment. These include the proceeds from the sale of certain properties, sales of which occurred only shortly before the institution of the dissolution proceedings, and a diamond ring. Whether or not these were marital assets at the date of the filing of the petition (or whether they exist at all), what value they have, and how they should be allocated are issues for the trial court. In addition, the joint bank accounts, mutual funds, and credit card debts were not valued.
We also note that on remand the trial court should clarify the finding of arrearage in temporary alimony. No judgment was entered against the husband on the finding, and the husband argues that this amount was, in effect, accounted for in the equitable distribution. If this was the trial court’s intent, then it should be stated in the final judgment. If not, then the wife would be entitled to a judgment for the amount of the arrearage.
We dismiss the husband’s challenge to the attorney’s fees award as it is not ripe for our consideration. Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). As to the remaining issues, including the wife’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to award alimony, we affirm.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GLICKSTEIN, WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Hurtado v. Rose-Jean Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)