DHERAJ PERSAUD, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1995-08-23
No. 94-2327
Before BASKIN, JORGENSON and COPE, JJ.
659 So. 2d 1191 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Dheraj Persaud appeals his convictions for armed burglary, grand theft, burglary of a dwelling, and petit theft. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirms the convictions, rejecting Persaud's challenges to the investigatory stop of his vehicle, the search of the vehicle, and the sufficiency of evidence linking him to the burglaries.


Holding

The court affirmed all convictions, holding that: (1) the veracity of citizen-informants need not be substantiated, and the facts provided founded suspicion for an investigatory stop; (2) no search occurred at the time of the stop—officers observed the stolen goods through windows and an open door after removing the occupants; and (3) sufficient evidence existed as Persaud owned and drove the vehicle filled with stolen property, and he was apprehended shortly after the observed burglary.


Headnotes

[1] The veracity of citizen-informants need not be substantiated to support an investigatory stop.

[2] A founded suspicion to justify an investigatory stop can arise from the totality of the circumstances, including observations of suspicious activity in an area with recen…

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Key Quotes

“"the veracity of citizen-informants need not be substantiated."”

Establishes that corroboration of a citizen informant's credibility is not required to justify an investigatory stop.

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Facts & Procedural History

At 3:00 a.m. on January 14, 1994, a homeowner in the Port Antigua area heard noise and observed an individual at a nearby house, then saw two men carr…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Dheraj Persaud appeals his convictions of armed burglary, grand theft, burglary of a dwelling, and petit theft. We affirm.

At 3:00 a.m. on January 14, 1994 a homeowner in the Port Antigua area of the Florida Keys heard a noise which sounded like aluminum shutters banging. The homeowner looked out his window and saw an individual at the rear of one of the houses across the canal. The individual seemed to fade into the shadows. The homeowner heard more noise and then saw two men carrying a ladder. The homeowner yelled at the men, at which time they put down the ladder and moved back into the shadows. The homeowner then saw a car leave with its headlights off. The car drove under a street light, allowing the homeowner to obtain a physical description of the car, but not a license number. The homeowner called the Sheriffs Department.

There had been recent burglaries in this subdivision. On the night in question, the police had conducted a burglary surveillance, but the officer had gone off duty at 1:30 a.m.

Sheriffs officers were dispatched to try to locate the car, which they did. The officers made a rough calculation that if a vehicle left the Port Antigua area at the time of the homeowner’s call and proceeded north at 60 miles per hour, the officers likely would intercept the vehicle around mile markers 80-82. At mile marker 80.5 the officers observed the vehicle which matched the description given by the homeowner. The officers could also see something bunched up in the back of the car which was obstructing the rear window. The officers stopped the car. Defendant was the owner and driver of the ear. He was accompanied by a passenger.1 After the defendant and codefendant were removed from the ear, the officers could see that the rear area of the car contained a large number of household items, on top of which had been placed a futon cushion. The cushion was the object which could be seen through the back window.

Defendant first contends that there was no corroboration of the veracity of the homeowner who called the police, and accordingly no founded suspicion to support an investigatory stop. That argument is completely without merit. “[T]he veracity of citizen-informants need not be substantiated.” State v. Novak, 502 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 511 So. 2d 299 (Fla.1987). Accord State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727, 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), review denied, 626 So. 2d 205 (Fla.1993). Under the circumstances of this case, there were more than enough facts, as set forth above, to create a founded suspicion and to justify an investigatory stop of the automobile. See § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1993).

Defendant next contends that the officers searched the vehicle at the time of the stop. Defendant argues that the facts did not give rise to probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, and that therefore the defendant’s motion to suppress the stolen property should have been granted.

We find no evidence in the record which supports the defendant’s contention that there was a search of this automobile at the time the vehicle was stopped. The record indicates that once the individuals had been removed from the car, the officers could see the large quantity of stolen goods through the windows and open door. The record is unequivocal that no search was conducted until later, after the vehicle had been towed away by the officers. The later search is not challenged. The motion to suppress evidence was correctly denied.

Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and the state’s reb-anee on subsection 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1993). This argument is without merit. Unlike P.L.C. v. State, 458 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), on which defendant relies, here defendant was the owner and driver of a vehicle which was filled with stolen property. The homeowner had observed two men with a ladder in the residential subdivision at 3:00 a.m. Defendant and codefendant were apprehended in a car matching the homeowner’s observations within a short time thereafter. See Scobee v. State, 488 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Affirmed.

. The passenger was the codefendant below. His appeal is not now before us.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Clark, 721 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …asonable suspicion. See Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520, 522-23 (Fla.1984); State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), review denied, 689 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.1997); State v. Reyes, 680 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Persaud v. State, 659 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) § 901.151, Fla.Stat. .(1997); see also Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 249 (Fla.1995).3 II. As to the…
  • Maynard v. State, 742 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …resident of the area qualified as a citizen-informant); State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d at 218-19 (restaurant manager who gave her name and address and who acknowledged the police when they arrived at the scene was a citizen-informant); Persaud v. State, 659 So. 2d 1191, 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (homeowner burglary victim who called police to report the crime was a citizen-informant). In Miller v. State, 613 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), this court treated a caller who claimed to be1 the suspect’s wife as a…
  • State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
    …males, leaving Poinciana Homes just after 3:00 a.m. The van was promptly spotted and stopped in a place which was consistent with that information. The description was sufficient. See Franklin v. State, 374 So. 2d at 1152; see also Persaud v. State, 659 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 667 So. 2d 775 (Fla.1996). The fact that another vehicle might fit the same description did not defeat the reasonable suspicion. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(g) (3d ed. 1996). De…

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