SHANARVATY WOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Wood appeals his conviction based on a negotiated plea agreement whereby he was sentenced as an adult at age 15 to two concurrent 20-year sentences for attempted first-degree murder. The court held that the trial court failed to make required written findings under Florida law and failed to ensure Wood's knowing waiver of his rights before imposing adult sanctions.
A negotiated plea agreement does not waive a juvenile defendant's right to require written findings supporting adult sanctions. The trial court must affirmatively inform the juvenile of the rights under section 39.059(7) and ensure the juvenile voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives those rights. Here, the trial court failed to mention those rights to Wood or document an express waiver.
[1] A negotiated plea agreement to impose adult sanctions does not waive a juvenile defendant's right to written findings absent an intelligent and knowing waiver on the reco…
[2] A trial judge must inform a juvenile of the rights provided for in section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes, and ensure the juvenile voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A]bsent an intelligent and knowing waiver on the record a negotiated plea agreement does not waive a juvenile's rights for the court to make written findings and reasons for the imposition of adult sanctions.”
Establishes the core holding that plea agreements cannot waive statutory rights to written findings for adult sanctions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWood, then 15 years old, entered a plea agreement with the state in which the state nol prossed charges of attempted robbery with a firearm, grand the…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
Wood appeals from the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, attacking his two concurrent twenty-year prison sentences for attempted first degree murder. He entered into a plea agreement with the state whereby the state nol prossed charges of attempted robbery with a firearm, three counts of grand theft of a motor vehicle, and one count of grand theft, second degree. The plea agreement provided that Wood, then fifteen years old, would be sentenced as an adult to a twenty-year term, with a three year minimum mandatory sentence. No direct appeal was filed.
None of the grounds raised by Wood in his motion has merit except the argument that he should not have been sentenced as an adult, without the trial court first making the findings required by section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (1991). No written findings were made by the trial court in this case, although based on the statements made by the trial court at sentencing, there was ample material the court could have drawn on to make such findings.
Pittman v. State, 620 So. 2d 1232 (Fla.1993) holds that a negotiated plea agreement to impose adult sanctions does not waive a juvenile defendant’s right to written findings. The court said:
[AJbsent an intelligent and knowing waiver on the record a negotiated plea agreement does not waive a juvenile’s rights for the court to make written findings and reasons for the imposition of adult sanctions.
Pittman, 620 So. 2d at 1233, quoting Sirmons v. State, 620 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla.1993). Explaining what constitutes an intelligent and knowing waiver, the court in Sirmons stated that a trial judge must inform a juvenile of the rights provided for in section 39.059(7) and insure that the juvenile “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives those rights.” Sirmons at 1252. At a minimum, this would require that the trial judge advise the juvenile of the rights provided in section 39.059(7).
In this case, the record of the plea hearing shows that the trial judge made no mention to Wood of those rights, nor is a waiver of section 39.059(7) expressly noted in the plea agreement. The plea agreement merely says Wood agrees to be sentenced as an adult, presumably the same situation which transpired in Pittman.
We thus have no alternative but to vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing. At the resentencing, the trial court may make written findings as required by section 39.059(7) and impose adult sanctions, or the court could entertain Wood’s motion to withdraw his plea agreement which if granted, would free the state to pursue all the charges against Wood, including those not prossed, and also seek adult sanctions.
Sentences VACATED; REMANDED for Resentencing.
HARRIS, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…emanded for resentencing. Upon resentencing, the trial court may sentence appellant as an adult by making the written findings as required by section 39.057(7)(d) or the court may entertain appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. See Wood v. State, 655 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). . The statute mandates that the trial court 1) consider a predisposition report by the department regarding the suitability of the child for disposition as a child; 2) provide all parties present at the hearing with an op…
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Kison Evans v. State, 672 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…suitability of adult sanctions before imposing sentence. Our court previously held that this allegation is legally sufficient and precludes summary denial of a Rule 3.850 motion. See Ramos v. State, 660 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Wood v. State, 655 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). See also Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). If there is a complete absence of written findings, there is no authority for sentencing a juvenile as an adult and the resulting sentence is illegal. The state corr…
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Stuberfield v. State, 690 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Pearson v. State, 657 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Walker v. State, 656 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Knight v. State, 656 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Philmore v. State, 656 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Wood v. State, 655 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Gammage v. State, 655 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Crain v. State, 653 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Satalino v. State, 652 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Sales v. State, 652 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). . While Miller…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sirmons v. State, 620 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1993)
- Pittman v. State, 620 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1993)