LOUIS M. GILL, APPELLANT,
v.
AURELIA M. GILL, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the husband to pay a portion of the wife's attorney's fees when the wife received substantial marital assets and alimony, giving her an equal or greater ability to pay.
In a marital dissolution case, the husband appealed the award of permanent periodic alimony, more than half of the marital assets, and attorney's fees…
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WHATLEY, Judge.
The appellant, Louis M. Gill, the husband in this marital dissolution case, contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the appellee wife, Aurelia M. Gill, permanent periodic alimony, more than one-half of the parties’ marital assets, and $5,000 in attorney’s fees. While we find there is no error as to the distribution of marital assets or the award of permanent alimony, we conclude the trial court did abuse its discretion in ordering the husband to pay a portion of the wife’s attorney’s fees. We, therefore, reverse on that issue only.
“When the trial court has made a truly equitable distribution of marital assets, it is inequitable to diminish the award by requiring one party to pay the other’s fees where both have substantially equal ability to pay.” Murray v. Murray, 598 So. 2d 310, 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Brown v. Brown, 572 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Benekos v. Benekos, 557 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and cases cited therein. An award of attorney’s fees under such circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. Mwiray; Brown; Benekos.
In the instant case, the trial court distributed to the wife fifty percent or more of the parties’ marital assets. The wife was further awarded fifty percent or more of the husband’s gross monthly income as permanent periodic alimony. Since, under these circumstances, the wife has an ability equal to, if not greater than, the husband to pay her attorney, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the husband to make any contribution to the payment of the wife’s attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. The final judgment of dissolution, however, is affirmed in all other respects.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
PARKER, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
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Boyett v. Eldis Raymell Boyett, 683 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…on, his wife’s $9,000 hospital bill that he was required to pay, and his lack of savings, the trial court erred in requiring him to contribute to his wife’s attorney’s fees, given the fact that she had some stock and savings); see also Gill v. Gill, 652 So. 2d 1270, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“When the trial court has made a truly equitable distribution of marital assets ... it is inequitable to diminish the award by requiring one party to pay the other’s fees where both have substantially equal ability to pay.”…
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Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, 663 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…es’ total income provides the Wife with a much superior net income. To require the Husband to pay 80% of the Wife’s attorney’s fees in addition to this unfavorable allocation of marital assets and liabilities is an abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill, 652 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Kovar v. Kovar, 648 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). This court has consistently held that when equitable distribution…
Authorities Cited
- Myron Lee Murray v. Murray, 598 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Benekos v. Benekos, 557 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Brown v. Brown, 572 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)