EDMOND FRANCIS LIETZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that certain conditions of probation and costs imposed by the trial court were improper and must be stricken.
[1] Special conditions of probation that are not orally pronounced at sentencing are invalid.
[2] A trial court's failure to orally pronounce special conditions of probation requires those conditions to be stricken.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. His appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, indicating no meritorious grounds for appeal. The c…
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BLUE, Judge.
Edmond Francis Lietz appeals from his convictions and sentences for two counts of grand theft. Lietz’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). After an independent review of the record and the law, we see no error affecting his convictions and therefore affirm. We remand, however, to strike certain conditions of probation not orally pronounced and to strike two improperly imposed costs.
First, the trial court imposed special conditions of probation but failed to announce these conditions at sentencing. This was error. George v. State, 624 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Thus, we affirm the portion of condition 4 insofar as it prohibits the ownership or possession of a firearm but we strike the part that implies Lietz’s probation officer may consent to the possession of a firearm. We also strike the part of condition 4 relating only to weapons. In addition, we strike that portion of condition 7 relating to excessive use of intoxicants. Because these conditions are contained in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986, we certify the same question of public importance stated in Hart v. State, 651 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995):
DOES THE SUPREME COURT’S PROMULGATION OF THE FORM ‘ORDER OF PROBATION’ IN FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.986 CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO PROBATIONERS OF CONDITIONS 1-11 SUCH THAT ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT OF THESE CONDITIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS UNNECESSARY?
Second, the trial court imposed costs of prosecution without following the statutory procedure and assessed a sum for the “court improvement fund.” We strike these costs; on remand, the state may seek only the costs of prosecution. See Reyes v. State, No. 92-03336, — So. 2d — (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 15, 1995) (en banc); Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences but remand to strike certain special conditions of probation and certain costs. Question certified.
RYDER, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996)…d in at least six other cases from the Second District: Hall v. State, 652 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 663 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1995); Emond v. State, 652 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 660 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1995); Lietz v. State, 652 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Farrington v. State, 654 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 663 So. 2d 631 (Fla.1995); Geller v. State, 651 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 663 So. 2d 631 (Fla.1995); Sheffield v. State, 651 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d D…
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Roberson v. State, 654 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…er and the community control order which prohibits ownership or possession of a firearm, but we strike that portion which implies that the defendant’s probation or community control officer may consent to possession of a firearm. See Lietz v. State, 652 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Fitts v. State, 649 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We also strike the part of condition four relating only to weapons. Id. Second, we strike the portion of condition six of the probation order and the community [*1257] control o…
Authorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Hart v. State, 651 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- George v. State, 624 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Holmes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 624 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)