STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BASILIO PANDELIS LUKAS, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal of charges against Basilio Pandelis Lukas for DUI manslaughter and manslaughter. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial judge improperly conducted a mini-trial and weighed evidence when deciding a motion to dismiss, and that sufficient facts existed for a jury to potentially find culpable negligence.
The appellate court held that the trial court improperly granted the motion to dismiss. When material factual allegations in a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the trial court must ordinarily deny the motion to dismiss. The court concluded that sufficient facts existed such that a jury could properly find culpable negligence.
[1] A trial court must deny a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) when the state's traverse denies or disputes material factual…
[2] When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), the trial court may not conduct a mini-trial or improperly weigh th…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Ordinarily, when material factual allegations in a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the trial court must deny the motion to dismiss.”
Establishes the legal standard for deciding motions to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4)
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLukas was charged with two counts of DUI manslaughter and two counts of manslaughter. Undisputed facts included evidence that Lukas was speeding, had …
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RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
The State of Florida challenges the trial court’s dismissal of two counts of DUI manslaughter 1 and two counts of manslaughter2 brought against Basilio Pandelis Lukas. We reverse.
Lukas filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) which included witnesses’ affidavits concerning the incident. The state filed a motion to strike, a traverse, and, later, a demurrer to an amended motion to dismiss. Although the state’s traverse did not deny with specificity the material facts alleged in the motion to dismiss, the state alleged additional facts and factual discrepancies upon which it intended to rely at trial. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss as to all four counts.
Ordinarily, when material factual allegations in a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the trial court must deny the motion to dismiss. State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d).
The undisputed facts include evidence of speeding, the smell of alcohol on Lukas’s breath, and admissions by Lukas to paramedics at the scene that he had been drinking. These facts militate against him.
The judge considered the state’s evidence that Lukas had been drinking and speeding and concluded, despite the state’s additional allegations, that the evidence was insufficient to prove a prima facie case of impairment.
We have determined that the judge effectively conducted a mini-trial and improperly weighed the evidence. Although the state’s traverse was unartfully drawn, the state has met its burden. The state did not specifically dispute the facts alleged in the (c)(4) motion, but, instead, alleged additional facts. We, nonetheless, conclude, in resolving all inferences against Lukas as we must do, that it cannot be said that a jury could not properly find culpable negligence. See State v. De Jerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1973).
We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
DANAHY and PARKER, JJ., concur. . § 316.193(3), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. § 782.07, Fla.Stat. (1991).
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. de Jerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- DeJERINETT v. State, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)