VIVIAN MADISON, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, F/K/A RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Vivian Madison appealed a trial court judgment in a health insurance dispute, and the insurer cross-appealed regarding taxable costs. The court affirmed both appeals, holding that the policy's non-renewal and grace period provisions were unambiguous, the insurer made no material misrepresentations, and the trial court properly awarded deposition travel expenses as costs.
The court affirmed on all issues: the non-renewal and 90-day grace period provisions were clear and unambiguous; no material misrepresentation occurred; any statutory violation was harmless error given the jury award fully compensated Madison; and trial courts may award deposition travel expenses as costs when justified by the facts, despite guidelines suggesting otherwise.
[1] A non-renewal provision in a health insurance policy is clear and unambiguous when it allows an insurer to non-renew on the policy anniversary date if it is not renewing…
[2] When health insurance coverage terminates while an insured person is totally disabled, coverage is extended to the earliest of five contingencies, including 90 days after…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the non-renewal provision of the health insurance policy was clear and unambiguous. The policy allowed the defendant insurer to non-renew the subject policy on the anniversary date of the policy if the insurer was not renewing all policies of the same form in the state”
Establishes that the policy's non-renewal language was unambiguous and the insurer properly exercised its rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVivian Madison held a health insurance policy issued by Midland National Life Insurance Company. The insurer non-renewed the policy on its anniversary…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffiinsured, Vivian Madison, from a partially adverse final judgment entered in a suit to collect on a health insurance policy — and a cross-appeal by the defendant/insurer, Midland National Life Insurance Company, from the trial court’s order taxing as costs against the defendant certain deposition travel expenses. We affirm on both the main appeal and the cross-appeal.
First, we conclude that the trial court did not err, as urged, in determining in the final judgment that the non-renewal provision of the health insurance policy was clear and unambiguous. The policy allowed the defendant insurer to non -renew the subject policy on the anniversary date of the policy if the insurer was not renewing all policies of the same form in the state; such a non-renewal occurred in this ease.
Moreover, where, as here, such coverage is terminated at a time when an insured person is totally disabled, the coverage is extended to the earliest of five contingencies; the applicable contingency in this case was “the date which is 90 days after the date on which the insurance should have ended.” We reject the plaintiff insured’s argument that this was an ambiguous provision, as plainly the provision provides for a 90-day extension of coverage beyond the non-renewal date of the policy. This being so, there was also no error in denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial based on the jury’s refusal to award damages for medical costs incurred by the plaintiff beyond the 90-day grace period in the policy. See Prescott v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 133 Fla. 510, 183 So. 311 (1938); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Oliveras, 441 So. 2d 175, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1984); All-Dixie Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Moffatt, 212 So. 2d 347, 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
Second, we conclude that the trial court did not err, as urged, in entering a summary judgment for the defendant insurer on the plaintiff insured’s negligent misrepresentation claim. On this record, it is clear that the defendant insurer made no misrepresentation of a material fact to the plaintiff insured in selling its health insurance policy to the plaintiff. Hoon v. Pate Constr. Co., 607 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 618 So. 2d 210 (Fla.1993); Atlantic Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 491 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1986), rev. denied, 508 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1987).
Third, assuming without deciding, that section 627.613(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), was applicable to this health insurance policy, and that the defendant insurer violated the statute by failing to notify the plaintiff insured in writing within the prescribed statutory period as to why it was not paying certain submitted medical bills, we conclude that the plaintiff insured was fully compensated by the jury award of $115,000 for all necessary and reasonable medical expenses covered by the policy.
Accordingly, the error, if any, in directing a verdict in count six of the complaint was entirely harmless. See Sudderth v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 510 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Rodriguez v. Huguet, 332 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Brevard County v. Apel, 246 So. 2d 134, 135-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error in its award of taxable costs to the plaintiff insured for travel expenses incurred by plaintiff insured’s counsel in taking certain out-of-state depositions in this case. Although the Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs1 does not generally allow for these costs, there is no absolute bar, as urged, to such an award. This is so because all provisions for taxable costs contained in the uniform order are meant only as guidelines. Clearly, the trial court may deviate from such guidelines depending on the facts of the case as justice may require. No showing of an abuse of discretion has been made by the defendant insurer in the trial court’s award in this case.
AFFIRMED.
GLICKSTEIN and FARMER, JJ., and HUBBART, PHILLIP A., Associate Judge, concur. . Reeserv. Boats Unlimited, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1346, 1351 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Centex-Rooney Constr. Co., Inc. v. Martin Cnty., 725 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…n with the client or other expert witnesses should not be taxed.” Although we have noted that a trial court may deviate from the guidelines costs where the facts of the case or justice may require, see Madison v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 648 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), at the cost hearing O’Neal testified only that the trial transcripts were “necessary, reasonable, and related” to H & K’s preparation and trial of the County’s case. While most attorneys would agree that preparation for tr…
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State v. Skidmore, 720 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…is case, all provisions for taxable costs contained in the uniform order are meant only as guidelines. The trial court may deviate from the Guidelines depending on the facts of the case as justice may require. Madison v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 648 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In any event, the award of costs is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1228. We believe the court abused its discretion in awarding certain of these expenses. Specifically, the postage, long distance calls,…
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Beyel Bros., Inc. v. Lemenze, 720 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997). Under that statute, in light of the specific findings made by the trial court, we also affirm the award of travel costs in connection with a deposition. See Madison v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 648 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); § 768.79(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). The final judgments and order taxing costs and attorney’s fees are affirmed. WARNER and POLEN JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Atl. Nat'l Bank OF Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Prescott v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 133 Fla. 510 (Fla. 1938)
- Dick Reeser and Margaret Reeser v. Boats Unlimited, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Hoon v. Pate Constr. Co., Inc., 607 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Oliveras, 441 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Reese v. The State of Fla. ex rel. Malcolm E. Gracy, 212 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Brevard Cnty. v. Apel, 246 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Reed A. Sudderth v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 510 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Omelio Rodriguez v. Wilfredo Huguet & the Travelers Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)