DARIUS R. SHIPMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Darius Shipman was convicted of sale or delivery of cocaine to a minor and possession of cocaine based primarily on testimony from an undercover civilian operative. The court reversed because the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to bolster the witness's credibility through evidence of his personal motivation before the witness's credibility had been attacked.
The trial court erred in allowing improper bolstering of Strong's credibility through motive testimony when credibility had not been placed at issue. The error was not harmless because Strong was the only direct evidence linking Shipman to possession and delivery of cocaine, making the credibility bolstering outcome-determinative.
[1] A prosecutor impermissibly bolsters a witness's credibility by eliciting testimony about the witness's motives for assisting law enforcement before the witness's credibil…
[2] Testimony regarding a witness's personal reasons for assisting in law enforcement investigations is irrelevant and inadmissible when the witness's credibility has not bee…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state was permitted to elicit from Strong that he had been led to work as a police informant assisting in drug operations because his daughter had gotten "messed up" with cocaine when she was 15 years old.”
Describes the improper bolstering evidence the prosecutor was allowed to introduce about Strong's personal motivation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShipman was arrested during a drug operation in Fort Walton Beach. Civilian undercover operative Mr. Strong conducted six controlled drug buys, two al…
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ALLEN, Judge.
This is an appeal from convictions for sale or delivery of cocaine to a minor and possession of cocaine. Because the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to imper-missibly bolster the testimony of his chief witness, we reverse.
The appellant was arrested during the course of a drug operation in Fort Walton Beach. Mr. Strong, a civilian undercover operative, made six controlled buys, two of which allegedly involved the appellant. Strong testified at trial that in these two transactions, which were recorded and video taped, the appellant gave a piece of rock cocaine to a juvenile accomplice and directed Strong to throw his money on the ground. Over the objection of the defense, the state was permitted to elicit from Strong that he had been led to work as a police informant assisting in drug operations because his daughter had gotten “messed up” with cocaine when she was 15 years old.
The appellant argues that Strong’s testimony regarding his reasons for aiding police in drug operations was improper bolstering of the witness’s credibility before his credibility had been attacked. Indeed, the appellee concedes that Strong’s credibility had not been placed at issue and therefore that his motive testimony should have been excluded as irrelevant. See e.g., Whitted, v. State, 362 So. 2d 668 (Fla.1978); Jacob v. State, 546 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Mohorn v. State, 462 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985): However, the appellee argues that the error was harmless. We cannot agree.
First, the prosecutor emphasized in closing argument that it is “extremely significant that Mr. Strong has come in here, a citizen that has absolutely no reason in the world to lie, fabricate or make anything up, no motivation whatsoever, none.” Furthermore, the only evidence actually linking appellant to the possession and delivery of the rock cocaine came from Strong; the video does not show or even suggest that the appellant passed the cocaine to the juveniles to make the sales. The two juveniles to whom the appellant allegedly handed the cocaine to make the two sales both admitted that they had sold the cocaine to Strong that day, but both denied that the appellant gave them the cocaine or assisted in the sale. The appellant likewise denied handing the juveniles the cocaine or aiding them in any way. The only direct evidence that the appellant possessed the cocaine and passed it off to the juveniles came from Strong.
In light of the pivotal role that Strong played in the prosecution’s case, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper bolstering of Strong’s credibility did not affect the verdict. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.
BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Simpson v. State, 824 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…e trial court erred in overruling counsel’s objection and permitting the state to bolster the testimony of the officers when their testimony had not been impeached first. See Whitted v. State, 362 So. 2d 668, 673 (Fla.1978); accord Shipman v. State, 647 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Jacob v. State, 546 So. 2d 113, 114-15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). While the state argues that defense counsel opened the door in his opening statement by stating that the weapon was not found on appellant, even if we were to accept the…
Authorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Whitted v. State, 362 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1978)
- Jacob v. State, 546 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Mohorn v. State, 462 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)