AUNDRE MINNIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Aundre Minnis was convicted of manslaughter for shooting a victim. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court's improper admission of hearsay evidence identifying him as the shooter.
The appellate court held that both hearsay statements were inadmissible because they had no purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that Minnis was the shooter), and no applicable hearsay exceptions applied. The errors were not harmless because officer testimony carries significant credibility and the statements directly undermined Minnis's accident defense. The motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied because conflicting inferences existed regarding intent.
[1] Testimony that a witness overheard a statement identifying the defendant as the shooter is inadmissible hearsay when offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
[2] A statement made by an anonymous source identifying a defendant as a suspect in a crime is inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove the defendant's involvement.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find this testimony to be inadmissible hearsay. In fact, this would be hearsay within hearsay and would need an exception for each statement.”
Establishes the core legal error—the trial court admitted double hearsay without proper exceptions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 24, 1994, two men were shot; one victim, Jean Woodside, died. Through an anonymous source and witness Sarah Noel, officers learned a suspect …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Truth Of The Matter Asserted cases and more on FLexlaw
RAMIREZ, JUAN, Jr., Associate Judge.
Appellant, Aundre Minnis, appeals his conviction and sentence for manslaughter. We reverse.
On March 24, 1994, Detective Mark Engle was notified of a shooting of two men. One of the victims, Jean Woodside, died as a result of his wound. Through an anonymous source, the officers learned that the suspect was named Aundre. They were also told by Sarah Noel that Aundre was the shooter. When the officers interviewed Aundre Min-nis, he first claimed that he saw the incident, but was not involved. After the second victim of the shooting, Vorbes Jeanty, implicated the appellant, he was again interviewed. He then admitted that he had shot the victim, but it was an accident. He was arrested and charged.
During trial, Officer Engle was allowed to testify over defense objection that he had been told by Sarah Noel that she had overheard on the telephone Vorbes Jeanty say, “Aundre might have shot me man.” The court overruled the hearsay objection stating that it did not go to the truth of the matter asserted.
We find this testimony to be inadmissible hearsay. In fact, this would be hearsay within hearsay and would need an exception for each statement. Hill v. State, 549 So. 2d 179 (Fla.1989). The statement of Jeanty identifying the shooter as Aundre can have no other purpose than for the truth of the matter asserted, that Aundre did the shooting. Likewise, Sarah Noel’s statement to the officer that she had overheard Jeanty identify the defendant as the shooter can have no other purpose than to incriminate the defendant. There are no exceptions for either of the statements. The trial judge also allowed Detective James M. Tedder, over defense objection on hearsay grounds, to testify as follows:
I got a call from, uh, an anonymous female stating that she had seen suspects, uh, involved in the shooting run through a yard and down Canal Terrace and subsequently they gave us the name, first name only of Aundre. Did not give us the last name. Did not give me the last name.
This statement was also inadmissible hearsay. There can be no reason for the statement of an anonymous female identifying the defendant as a suspect in the shooting seen running through a yard and down the street other than to incriminate the defendant. Neither the state of mind of the officer nor the female were material to the case. State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla.1990); Bell v. State, 595 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
We cannot say that these errors were harmless. Under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1986), there is a reasonable possibility that the errors affected the verdict. The statement that the defendant was seen running through a yard and down the street would negate his theory that the incident was an accident. This court has previously said that an officer’s testimony is seen as highly-credible and carries a danger of influencing the jury. Stamper v. State, 576 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla 4th DCA 1991), quoting Perez v. State, 371 So. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). We cannot say that the statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lastly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. A review of the record shows that the motion was properly denied. Where there are different opinions or inferences to be drawn, the trial court should submit the case to the jury. Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974). The defendant gave inconsistent statements to the police regarding the fatal shooting. He attempted to avoid responsibility by lying to the police, a clear indication of guilt. Smith v. State, 424 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145, 103 S.Ct. 3129, 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983).
We, therefore, reverse and remand this cause for a new trial based on the prejudicial statements allowed into evidence.
DELL, C.J., and STONE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
M.P.W. v. State, 702 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…ces from the evidence, and its determination should be afforded great weight. See Ford v. State, 251 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Where there are different inferences to be drawn, a judgment of acquittal should not be granted. See Minnis v. State, 645 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Anderson v. State, 504 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). This testimony constitutes direct evidence of the theft. See M.L.K v. State, 454 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). “Direct evidence is that to which the witness testifies o…
-
Sankar v. State, 928 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…prosecutor further highlighted the non-appearing witness’ statement, as follows: “[T]hat individual stated the same exact thing that he stated to Officer Berryman and that was that Adrian Sankar struck the victim with a bottle.” In Minnis v. State, 645 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), this court reversed the trial court for allowing a police officer to testify over defense objection that he had been told by a witness that she had overheard on the telephone another witness [*1267] say that appellant might have…
-
Valerie and Russell Hammond v. Sharon and John Mulligan, Sr., 667 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…nd that appellees’ cross-examination of Marrese concerning appellant’s statements to him pertaining to her visit with Caldwell was inadmissible hearsay not subject to any exception. See Hill v. State, 549 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla.1989); Minnis v. State, 645 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Hitchcock v. State, 636 So. 2d 572, 573-574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Escoto v. State, 624 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Hall v. State, 622 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). See also § 90.801(1)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993); Peterk…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974)
- State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990)
- THE Florida BAR v. Merwin, 424 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1982)
- Smith v. Florida, 462 U.S. 1145 (U.S. 1983)
- Hill v. State, 549 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1989)
- Perez v. State, 371 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Bell v. State, 595 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Stamper v. State, 576 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)