MANNING CONEY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Manning Coney was convicted after trial testimony from a child victim presented via closed-circuit television. The appellate court reversed and remanded due to multiple trial errors: insufficient findings of fact for closed-circuit testimony, inadequate attorney-defendant communication, improper competency determination, and failure to excuse a biased juror.
The trial court committed reversible error on all grounds: it failed to make required case-specific findings before allowing closed-circuit testimony; the communication relay system violated the defendant's right to counsel; the competency determination was inadequate given the outdated evidence and lack of inquiry into the victim's understanding of the truthfulness obligation; and Juror Smith should have been excused for demonstrating a preconceived belief favoring the victim's credibility.
[1] A trial court must make case-specific findings of fact before allowing a victim to testify by closed-circuit television.
[2] A defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is violated when a relay system, rather than instantaneous communication, is used to facilitate communicat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“trial judge must make case-specific findings of fact before allowing closed-circuit testimony”
Establishes the mandatory legal requirement for closed-circuit television testimony under section 92.54(5)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA trial court allowed a child victim to testify via closed-circuit television without making adequate case-specific findings of fact. The defendant co…
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PER CURIAM.
The State concedes that the trial court made insufficient findings of fact before allowing the victim to testify by closed-circuit television. See § 92.54(5), Fla.Stat. (1991); Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1375-76 (Fla.1994) (trial judge must make case-specific findings of fact before allowing closed-circuit testimony).
The trial court further erred in refusing to allow the defendant to have instantaneous communications with his attorney during the victim’s closed-circuit testimony. The relay system employed at trial—whereby the defendant was accompanied by a certified legal intern who could carry messages to defense counsel—was inadequate, and violated the defendant’s eonsti-tutional right to the assistance of counsel. See Myles v. State, 602 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla.1992) (communication system whereby bailiff relayed messages from defendant to counsel was inadequate).
The State also concedes that the trial court erred in finding the victim competent to testify.
The trial court did not personally interview the victim, but merely watched a videotaped interview of the victim, and listened to a doctor’s opinion about the victim.
However, the videotape was made approximately two years prior to trial, and the doctor’s opinion was based upon an examination of the victim which occurred approximately one year prior to trial.
Consequently, the trial court failed to adequately inquire into the victim’s competency at the time of trial. See State v. Ford, 626 So. 2d 1338, 1347 (Fla. 1993) (a finding of competency did not automatically carry over to testimony given 10 and 12 days later). The error in the trial court’s competency ruling was further exacerbated by the fact that no finding was made that the victim understood the obligation to tell the truth. See Wade v. State, 586 So. 2d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (a competency inquiry must demonstrate the witness’s understanding of the moral obligation to tell the truth). This omission was especially important in this case since the victim had previously stated that she would tell a he to get the defendant in trouble.
In addition, the trial court erred in not excusing juror Smith for cause. Juror Smith’s responses during voir dire demonstrated that she had a preconceived belief that a victim in a case such as this would only tell the truth. See Hamilton v. State, 547 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla.1989) (“‘A juror is not impartial when one side must overcome a preconceived opinion in order to prevail.’” (quoting Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985))).
Finally, none of the foregoing errors can be considered harmless since, based upon a review of the record as a whole, it can not be said that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect the jury’s decision to find the defendant guilty. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986); Holland v. State, 632 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Based on the foregoing, we need not address the defendant’s remaining points. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences imposed in this case are reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Davis v. State, 656 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…this case. His statements were based on his own experiences, including being involved in a sexual discrimination lawsuit and his involvement with his brother’s divorce. Juror Kostick’s responses are similar to those of the juror in Coney v. State, 643 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), where the third district found error in not excusing the juror for cause. In Coney, the juror’s responses during voir dire demonstrated a preconceived belief that “a victim in a case such as this would only tell the truth.”…
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Denis Salgado v. State, 829 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…e than civilian witnesses); Davis v. State, 656 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(error not to excuse juror for cause in domestic violence case who stated that he would tend to be sympathetic to and give benefit of doubt to woman); Coney v. State, 643 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(error not to excuse juror who demonstrated that she had a preconceived belief that a victim in particular case would only tell the truth); Mann v. State, 571 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(state properly confessed error w…
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Polite v. State, 754 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…nce of one side or another. See Davis v. State, 656 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (error not to excuse juror for cause in domestic violence case who stated that he would tend to be sympathetic to and give benefit of doubt to woman); Coney v. State, 643 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (error not to excuse juror who demonstrated that she had a preconceived belief that a victim in particular case would only tell the truth); Duncan v. State, 588 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (state properly confessed error where tw…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1985)
- Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1994)
- Frank v. Straley, 602 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1992)
- Hamilton v. State, 547 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1989)
- State v. Ford, 626 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1993)
- Wade v. State, 586 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Holland v. State, 632 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)