RICHARD E. SCHUMACHER, APPELLANT,
v.
TOWN OF JUPITER, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the zoning ordinance amendment was not arbitrary or capricious and that the appellant waived any defects in notice. The court also upheld the validity of the zoning scheme excluding automobile dealerships.
[1] A municipality acts neither arbitrarily nor capriciously when amending a zoning ordinance if the amendment is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
[2] A landowner may waive defects in statutory notice requirements for zoning proceedings by appearing at the hearing and fully presenting objections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant challenged a town's amendment to a zoning ordinance that excluded automobile dealerships. Appellant claimed defects in the notice provided f…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm, finding no error by the trial court in holding that Jupiter did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in amending a zoning ordinance and that appellant had waived any defect in the notice provided to him of the proceedings during which the change was effected.
As to the validity of the zoning scheme excluding automobile dealerships itself we rest our decision on the discussion and analysis in Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 845 F.Supp. 1540 (S.D.Fla.1993). In that case the same zoning scheme involved herein was challenged and upheld. We see no need to repeat the analysis here. See also Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F. 2d 1369 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1400, 128 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994).
On the notice issue, appellant claims error in the trial court’s finding that he waived the notice requirements by his extensive knowledge of and actual attendance and participation in the relevant proceedings. The general rule is that, while strict compliance with statutory notice requirements is mandatory and jurisdictional, a contesting landowner may waive the right, or be es-topped, to assert a defect in the notice if that landowner appeared at the hearing and was able to fully and adequately present any objections to the ordinance. Malley v. Clay County Zoning Comm’n, 225 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). If, however, the notice is so lacking that the landowner was unable to fully prepare for the hearing to voice an objection, or where the landowner can otherwise demonstrate prejudice, then courts will refuse to find a waiver or estoppel. Id.
Here, as in Malley, the record reflects that appellant, through counsel, had substantial and continuous knowledge of the pending proceedings and did appear at the final hearing on the proposed ordinance and express his objections. As in Malley we find no error in the trial court’s holding that appellant waived any claimed defects in the notice and was estopped from asserting such defects as a basis for invalidating the ordinance.
ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN and STONE, JJ., concur.
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Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…e to waiver or similar grounds. See Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla.1994) (holding that where the defendant acknowledges timely receipt of notice, strict compliance with certified mail provision is not required); Schumacher v. Town of Jupiter, 643 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (stating that a landowner may waive or be estopped to assert the right to notice where he appears at the hearing and is able to fully and adequately present any objections to an ordinance); Anderson v. State, 637 So. 2d 971 (Fla.…
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Evergreen Lakes HOA, Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters AT London, 230 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…uirements of [the medical malpractice statute] may be excused by a showing of estoppel or waiver” even though “[t]he presuit notice and screening requirements of [the statute] represent more than mere technicalities”); Schumacher v. Town of Jupiter, 643 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (holding that although “strict compliance with statutory notice requirements [for amending a zoning ordinance] is mandatory and jurisdictional, a contesting landowner may waive the right, or be estopped, to assert a defect in…
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The City OF Jacksonville v. John and Noreen Huffman, 764 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…only if the party was unable to fully prepare for and present objections at the hearing or was otherwise prejudiced by the defective notice. See Malley v. Clay County Zoning Comm’n, 225 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); Schumacher v. Town of Jupiter, 643 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The lower court’s only statements regarding prejudice were in the two findings discussed above, that Greenland and Salvatore were unable to adequately prepare for the Land Use and Zoning Committee hearing because they had receiv…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Corn v. City OF Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1993)
- Malley v. Clay Cnty. Zoning Comm'n, 225 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 845 F. Supp. 1540 (S.D. Fla. 1993)