GERARD HECK AND BETTY ANN HECK, APPELLANTS,
v.
PARKVIEW PLACE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLEE
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Homeowners erected a trellis in front of their window without approval from their homeowners association. The trial court found the trellis violated the Declaration's prohibition on awnings and shutters, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a trellis is neither an awning nor a shutter under the plain language of the covenant.
The court held that the trellis does not violate Article IX(14) of the Declaration because a trellis is neither an awning nor a shutter as those terms are commonly understood, and the plain language of the Declaration does not prohibit trellises.
[1] A court should construe a contract provision according to its plain, ordinary meaning, relying on the meaning most commonly understood in relation to the subject matter a…
[2] A written contract provision that is not ambiguous should be construed as written, and the court can give it no other meaning.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where contracts are clear and unambiguous, they should be construed as written, and the court can give it no other meaning.”
Establishes the fundamental principle governing interpretation of the Declaration—unambiguous terms must be read as written.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Hecks installed a trellis in front of their picture window in the Parkview Place community without seeking prior approval from the homeowners asso…
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MELANIE G. MAY, Associate Judge.
As Shakespeare once said: “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” In this case, the court is called upon to determine whether a trellis may be called by “Awning” or “Shutter”? We think not. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
In this case, the homeowners erected a trellis in front of their picture window without having first sought approval from the homeowner’s association. The Association sued the homeowners and asked the trial court to declare that the following provision of the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions precluded the placement of the trellis in front of a picture window, without approval.
The applicable provision, Article IX(14), provided:
Awnings and Shutters. No shades, awnings, window guards, mirror tint window materials, hurricane or storm shutters, ventilators, fans or air conditioning devices shall be used in or about the buildings except as shall have been approved by the Declarant [Parkview Homes, Inc.] or Association, which approval may be withheld on purely aesthetic grounds within the sole discretion of the Declarant or Association.
The Association moved for summary judgment and submitted an affidavit of the developer, who attested that the trellis was precisely the type of alteration sought to be prohibited by the Declaration. The homeowners submitted affidavits to support the positive effects of the trellis.
The trial court denied the summary judgment motion and the issue went to trial. After determining the existence of an actual controversy, the trial court stated the issue as whether the Declaration ‘Vas intended to prohibit erection of the defendants’ trellis without the association’s prior approval.” The court, without an explicit finding that the provision was ambiguous, permitted testimony concerning the meaning of the provision.
The trial court found the undisputed testimony established that the trellis shaded the window and was therefore a window shade and guard. It further found that the drafters intended the Declaration to prohibit such alterations to the homes’ windows. Finally, the court found that the presence of other trellises within the community did not estop the Association from prohibiting the trellis at issue in this case. The trial court then held that the trellis violated Article IX(14) of the Declaration and awarded attorney’s fees to the Association.
“Where contracts are clear and unambiguous, they should be construed as written, and the court can give it no other meaning.” Institutional & Supermarket Equipment, Inc. v. C & S Refrigeration, Inc., 609 So. 2d 66, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). This basic tenet is undisputed; both counsel agreed at oral argument that the “Awnings and Shutters” provision in this case is NOT ambiguous. The issue then is simply whether the Declaration prohibits the construction of the trellis in this case.
When giving a written provision its plain, ordinary meaning — the court should rely upon “the meaning most commonly understood in relation to the subject matter and circumstances....” Thompson v. C.H.B.,
Inc., 454 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The Declaration in this case prohibits, without prior approval of the Association or De-clarant, the construction of “shades, awnings, window guards, mirror tint window materials, hurricane or storm shutters, ventilators, fans, or air conditioning devices.” It does not prohibit “trellises.” Given the plain, ordinary meaning of the terms employed by the Declaration, the construction of the trellis in this case did not run afoul of the Declaration’s prohibition. Absent a finding of ambiguity, which both sides concede does not exist, we decline to s-t-r-e-t-e-h the terms employed by the Declaration to the facts of this case. We specifically find the homeowner’s trellis is not an “Awning” or “Shutter” as defined by the Declaration. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.
POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Emerald Ests. Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gorodetzer, 819 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…ot unless approved by the [ACC].” We fail to see how this clear language represents anything but an express prohibition against the erection of any antennae without prior approval of the ACC. See, e.g., Heck v. Parkview Place Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 642 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Restrictions found within a Declaration are afforded a strong presumption of validity, and a reasonable unambiguous restriction will be enforced according to the intent of the parties as expressed by the clear and ordinary meani…
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Wheeler v. Wheeler, Erwin & Fountain, P.A., 964 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…t specifically provides for a different meaning. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. 99 Cent Stuff-Trail Plaza, LLC, 811 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Beans v. Chohonis, 740 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Heck v. Parkview Place Homeowners Ass’n, 642 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Construing the provisions of the two agreements according to their plain and ordinary meaning, we conclude that there is nothing in either the Deferred Compensation Agreement or the Stock Restriction and Retirement Agreeme…
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Authorities Cited
- Institutional & Supermarket Equip., Inc. v. C & S Refrigeration, Inc., 609 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Thompson v. C.H.B., Inc., 454 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)