J.E. STACK, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
JOE A. LEWIS, APPELLEE
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Stack appeals an award of attorneys' fees enhanced by a 2.0 multiplier, arguing the trial court erred in applying the multiplier to both the lodestar fee and appellate fees. The court affirmed, holding that multipliers are appropriate under Florida law and may be applied to appellate fees when the same attorneys represent the client throughout the litigation under a contingency arrangement.
The court held that multipliers are consistent with Florida law and may be properly applied to enhance lodestar fees. The court also held that a multiplier may be applied to appellate fees when the same attorneys represent the client throughout the litigation under a contingency arrangement, because the relevant moment for determining likelihood of success is 'at the outset' when representation commenced, not at the appellate stage.
[1] A multiplier may be applied to an attorney's lodestar fee award when justified by factors such as the uncertainty of prevailing, the uncertainty of collection, and the ma…
[2] The likelihood of success for the purpose of applying a multiplier to attorney's fees is determined at the outset of the litigation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the moment for determining the likelihood of success is 'at the outset' or 'at the time the case was initiated.'”
Establishes the critical timing principle for evaluating whether a multiplier should apply—success is measured when representation began, not at the appellate stage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis case arose from a dispute over a broker's fee. A jury verdict was entered for Lewis (appellee), and judgment was entered in his favor. The trial …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges an award of attorneys’ fees, contending that the trial court erred in applying a multiplier to the lodestar attorney fee, and in applying the multiplier to the appellate fees awarded. We affirm.
This case arose from a dispute over a broker’s fee. Following a jury verdict for the appellee, the court entered judgment for the appellee and reserved jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees and costs as provided by the parties’ contract. The court subsequently held a hearing on the costs and attorneys’ fees and determined the proper lodestar fee. The court then enhanced the lodestar by a factor of 2.0 due to “the substantial uncertainty of prevailing, the substantial uncertainty of collecting and because the result obtained was the maximum possible result.” Accordingly, the appellee was awarded attorneys’ fees based on the enhanced lodestar.
We conclude that the use of a multiplier in this case is consistent with the dictates of Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), and Standard Guaranty Insurance Company v. Quanstrom. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990), and their progeny.
Accordingly, we reject the appellant’s first argument that there was no basis for the use of a multiplier. The appellant next argues that in any event the multiplier should not apply to the fees earned from the appeal. The appellant reasons that the appeal process begins a new case and that a multiplier is inappropriate because the appellee’s likelihood of success on appeal was high since he won in the trial court. We do not find that reasoning sufficiently compelling to preclude application of the multiplier to the appellate fees in this case. Although no Florida case has addressed the precise argument advanced by the appellant, the supreme court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1993), approved the use of a multiplier for fees earned in the district court of appeal and supreme court for litigating entitlement to attorneys fees. Further, the case law clearly recognizes that the moment for determining the likelihood of success is “at the outset” or “at the time the case was initiated.” Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151; e.g., Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 835; Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla.1990).
Here, the appellee employed the same attorneys from the beginning of the litigation through appeal.
The trial court determined that at the time representation commenced, the probability of success was low. Because there was no change in representation and both the trial and appellate work were governed by a contingency arrangement, there is no reason to treat the appellate hours differently from the trial hours.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., 'concur.
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Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc., 734 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1999)…ty for a fee award is the parties’ contract. The First, Second, and Third District Courts of Appeal have upheld the consideration of contingency multipliers in contract cases, relying on our decisions in Rowe or Quanstrom. See, e.g., Stack v. Lewis, 641 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Askowitz v. Susan Feuer Interior Design, Inc., 563 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 510 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); see also Hollub v. Clancy, 706 So. 2d 16, 1…
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Bd. of Trs. of the Jacksonville Police & Fire Fund v. Kicklighter, 122 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…ces, P.A., the trial court used a fee multiplier of 1.5, ruling as follows: This Court previously determined that a fee multiplier of 1.5 is appropriate for attorneys fees awarded to Delegal Law Offices, P.A. Pursuant to the case of Stack v. Lewis, 641 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), when a trial court makes the determination as to the appropriateness of a fee multiplier, that same determination applies to the appellate fees expended by the same counsel in litigating the case on appeal. Accordingly, the Cour…
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TRG Columbus Dev. Venture, Ltd v. Sifontes, 230 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…his client. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla. 1990). Here, the trial court acknowledged that it did not conduct any inquiry as to the Quanstrom factors. Instead, it concluded— based on the reasoning of Stack v. Lewis, 641 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) and Board of Trustees of the Jacksonville Police & Fire Fund v. Kicklighter, 122 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)—that it was bound by law of the case to apply the multiplier that was previously applied to the litigation on the mer…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993)
- Lane v. Head, 566 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1990)