LANGSTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A CORPORATION, AND STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, A PUBLIC CORPORATION, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF STANDARD OIL COMPANY, A KENTUCKY CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR

Fla. | 1932-09-29
Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur., Buford, O.J., concurs in the opinion and judgment., Brown, J., not participating.
106 Fla. 834 Florida Supreme Court (1932) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 143 So. 771
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Langston Construction Company and its surety, Standard Accident Insurance Company, appealed a judgment against them on a contractor's surety bond. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the jury properly determined that materials supplied by Standard Oil Company to a subcontractor were used in the performance of the contract work.


Holding

The court held that the jury properly determined the factual question of whether the materials were used in the contract work, and that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding. The trial court committed no reversible error in refusing to set aside the verdict or in overruling motions for directed verdict.


Key Quotes

“The judgment to which this writ of error was taken was recovered on the contractor's surety bond given to secure payment of amounts due "to all persons supplying . . . labor, materials and supplies, used directly or indirectly" by the principal contractor or any subcontractor "in the prosecution of the work provided for" in the contract with the County.”

Establishes the scope of the surety bond obligation and what the claim was based upon.

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Facts & Procedural History

Langston Construction Company held a contract with Hillsborough County to pave streets in the Belmar subdivision in Tampa. Standard Oil Company suppli…

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Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

The Standard Oil Company furnished gasoline, oils and greases to one E. A. Wright, a subcontractor under Langston Construction Company, which had a contract with Hillsborough County for paving certain streets in a Tampa Subdivision known as “Belmar. ” The judgment to which this writ of error was taken was recovered on the contractor’s surety bond given to secure payment of amounts due “to all persons supplying . . . labor, materials and supplies, used directly or indirectly” by the principal contractor or any subcontractor “in the prosecution of the work provided for” in the contract with the County.

The uncontradieted evidence in the ease showed that the Standard Oil Company had supplied to Wright, oils, gasoline and greases to the amount of $4964.52. The controversy at the trial revolved around the insistence of the defendant that not all of these materials were used by the sub-contractor in prosecuting work on the “Bel*836mar” job. That question, however, was submitted to the jury for determination, and we believe properly so, since there was substantial evidence from which it might have been found that all of the particular gasoline, oils and greases sued for, were used in the prosecution of the “Belmar” work by Wright. The jury so found, and the trial court committed no reversible error in refusing to set aside the verdict on account of the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. For the same reason no error was committed in overruling the motions of defendant for a directed verdict.

Other errors have been assigned and argued, but it has not been made to appear that the court committed reversible error in the particular rulings complained of, therefore the judgment should not be otherwise reversed under the circumstances.

The doininant controversy between the parties was one of fact, and that matter of dispute was properly submitted for the consideration and determination of a jury, under charges which fully and fairly committed the ease to the jury’s consideration. The verdict for $4964.52 principal and $366.69 interest appears to be supported by substantial evidence, and will not be disturbed in view of its approval by the trial judge.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.

Buford, O.J., concurs in the opinion and judgment.

Ellis, J.

(concurring specially).—I agree to the conclusion and the statements in the last paragraph of the opinion.

Brown, J., not participating.

Concurrence
Ellis, J.

Ellis, J.

(concurring specially).—I agree to the conclusion and the statements in the last paragraph of the opinion.

Brown, J., not participating.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Manning v. State, 139 Fla. 845 (Fla. 1939)
    …v. State, 75 Fla. 229, 77 So. 879; Smith v. State, 66 Fla. 135, 63 So. 138; McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74, 47 So. 485; Caldwell v. State, 62 Fla. 18, 56 So. 497; Wilson v. State, 103 Fla. 262, 137 So. 225; Langston Const. Co. v. Hillsborough County, 106 Fla. 834, 143 So. 771. No error of law or procedure having been made to appear in this case, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. Buford, J., concurs in opinion and judgment. Justices Terrell and Ti-ioma…

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