MARGARET P. LEWIS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MAGGIE FLOWERS, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1994-06-03
No. 93-2509
COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.
637 So. 2d 966 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Margaret Lewis, as personal representative of a deceased's estate, appeals a summary judgment requiring the estate to repay public assistance benefits. The court held that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) failed to comply with statutory requirements to recover the debt within one year of death, and therefore the debt was discharged.


Holding

The court held that filing a caveat is insufficient to comply with the statutory deadline and that HRS must institute probate proceedings as a creditor or file a timely claim against the estate within one year of the debtor's death. Because HRS failed to do so, the debt was discharged and judgment should be entered in favor of the estate.


Headnotes

[1] A debt for public assistance paid to a decedent is discharged one year after the debtor's death unless the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services institutes pro…

[2] The filing of a caveat by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is insufficient to toll the one-year statutory deadline for asserting a claim against a dec…

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Key Quotes

“the statute plainly provides for discharge of the debt of the person accepting public assistance unless, within one year from the debtor's death, HRS does one of three things: (1) institutes probate proceedings as a creditor, (2) files a timely claim against the debtor's estate, or (3) sues to set aside a fraudulent conveyance”

Establishes the three statutory options HRS must pursue within one year, and that failure to do so results in discharge of the debt

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Facts & Procedural History

Maggie Flowers died testate on December 17, 1989, leaving a residence as her sole asset. HRS had provided public assistance to Flowers prior to her de…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIFFIN, Judge.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Margaret P. Lewis, as Personal Representative [“Lewis”] of the Estate of Maggie Flowers [“Flowers”], appeals a summary final judgment in favor of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services [“HRS”], allowing recovery of sums paid to the decedent, Flowers, in public assistance prior to her death. Lewis contends that because HRS failed to institute probate proceedings as a creditor or to file a timely claim against the debtor’s estate as required by section 409.345(2), Florida Statutes (1989)1 , prior to the expiration of one year, the debt was discharged, as provided by statute. We conclude that the prompt filing of a caveat by HRS was insufficient to avoid the one-year deadline and reverse.

This precise issue has previously been addressed by the Second District Court of Appeal in State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Rose, 475 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The court observed that the statute plainly provides for discharge of the debt of the person accepting public assistance unless, within one year from the debtor’s death, HRS does one of three things: (1) institutes probate proceedings as a creditor, (2) files a timely claim against the debtor’s estate, or (3) sues to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.

In this case, Flowers died testate on December 17, 1989, leaving as her sole asset a residence located in Orlando, Florida. HRS filed a caveat on January 4, 1990 but took no further action until an estate was opened and Lewis was appointed personal representative of Flowers’ estate in January 1992, more than two years after Flowers’ death. In April 1992, HRS filed a formal claim, which was objected to.

HRS contends that the interpretation of the Rose court places an unreasonable burden on HRS and improperly encourages a deceased’s heirs to intentionally delay estate proceedings in an effort to avoid the claim for reimbursement of public assistance paid. The trial court agreed with HRS. Nevertheless, as the Rose court indicated, the statutory language is clear. We also note that in the nine years since the Second District issued its Rose opinion, the legislature has not altered the statutory scheme. The summary final judgment rendered in favor of HRS is reversed and the cause remanded to the lower court with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of the Estate of Flowers.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . 409.345(2) DISCHARGE OF DEBT. — The debt created by this section shall be discharged 1 year after the death of the debtor unless the department shall have instituted probate proceedings as a creditor or filed a timely claim against the estate of the debtor or instituted a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance as defined in subsection (3).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Baptist Hosp. OF Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …its right to file a claim against his estate and regardless of whether Ms. Ptak had an alleged responsibility to notify judgment creditors of record. Bartkowiak, 645 So. 2d at 1083-84; see also Lewis v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 637 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).1 III. We do agree with Baptist’s alternative position that evidence that the survivor misled [*563] it into the erroneous belief that no estate was necessary because there were no individually held assets raises a triable issu…

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