CARLTON J. BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Carlton Brown challenges consecutive habitual violent offender (H.V.O.) sentences imposed under Florida law. The court reverses, holding that where a defendant receives multiple H.V.O. enhancements for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, the enhanced sentences must be served concurrently rather than consecutively.
While a trial court may sentence a defendant separately for each count with consecutive sentences, the court cannot enhance sentences as habitual violent offender sentences and make those enhanced sentences consecutive without specific legislative authorization. Therefore, where multiple H.V.O. enhancements arise from a single criminal episode, the enhanced sentences must be served concurrently.
[1] Consecutive habitual violent felony offender sentences are permissible for offenses arising from a single criminal episode, but the minimum mandatory portions of such sen…
[2] A trial court is not authorized to impose consecutive habitual violent felony offender sentences for offenses arising from the same criminal episode without specific legi…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, the trial court is not authorized, in our view, to both enhance Hale's sentence as a habitual offender and make each of the enhanced habitual offender sentences for the possession and the sale of the same identical piece of cocaine consecutive, without specific legislative authorization in the habitual offender statute.”
The Supreme Court's holding in Hale v. State establishing that consecutive H.V.O. enhancement sentences are impermissible without legislative authorization.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery committed during a single criminal episode. The trial court imposed consecutive enhanced sente…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Single Criminal Episode cases and more on FLexlaw
DANAHY, Acting Chief Judge.
This is the second time the appellant has brought this case before us challenging consecutive habitual violent felony offender (H.V.O.) sentences under section 775.084, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988).
Brown v. State, 599 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (Brown I).
In Brown I, relying upon Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1983), and Daniels v. State, 595 So. 2d 952 (Fla.1992), we determined that consecutive H.V.O. sentences are' permissible in instances of a single criminal episode like the one before us but the minimum mandatory portions of such sentences must be served concurrently. Upon remand and without comment on the ten-year minimum mandatory portions of the sentences the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences: thirty years’ incarceration for Count I followed by ten years’ incarceration and ten years’ probation for Count II.1 Based on the fact that the two crimes occurred during a single criminal episode, we again reverse because the supreme court has recently clarified Daniels so that the consecutive habitual violent offender sentences imposed upon remand were error. Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993).
Because the appellant’s case is still pending on direct appeal, he receives the benefit of the supreme court’s decision in Hale. Smith v. State, 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.1992). In Hale, the facts leading to the supreme court’s conclusion are indistinguishable from the facts before us: convictions for two counts of second degree felonies committed during a single episode. The defendant in Hale had convictions for sale and possession with intent to sell, the appellant in the instant case has two convictions for aggravated battery. The sentencing court in each instance enhanced the sentences pursuant to section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. In Hale, the supreme court held that the sentencing court could sentence the defendant separately for each count and have the sentences served consecutively. But the supreme court went on to say:
However, the trial court is not authorized, in our view, to both enhance Hale’s sentence as a habitual offender and make each of the enhanced habitual offender sentences for the possession and the sale of the same identical piece of cocaine consecutive, without specific legislative authorization in the habitual offender statute.
Hale, 630 So. 2d at 525. In accord with Hale, we reverse and remand for resentencing of the appellant to concurrent rather than consecutive habitual violent felony offender sentences. Appellant need not be present at resentencing.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
PARKER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. . For reasons not relevant here, the trial court mitigated the sentence on Count II from the previously imposed thirty years.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Windisch v. State, 709 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…tion and remanded with directions to run the imposed sentences concurrently. See Bell v. State, 679 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Golz v. State, 674 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Rolle v. State, 668 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Brown v. State, 630 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). See also Brown v. State, 647 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA [*607] 1994); Suggs v. State, 681 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Applying Hale to Windisch, we conclude that the trial court erred by imposing new sentences. Windisch contend…
-
Suggs v. State, 681 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…1 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 278, 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). See Golz v. State, 674 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Rolle v. State, 668 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Brown v. State, 647 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Brown v. State, 630 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). AFFIRMED. COBB, W. SHARP and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.…
-
Bell v. State, 679 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 278, 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). Accordingly, we reverse the sentences and remand this case with instructions that Bell’s enhanced sentences be ordered to run concurrently. Bell need not be present at re-sentencing. See Brown v. State, 630 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. PATTERSON, A.C.J., and SCHEB, JOHN M., Senior Judge, concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- Dean v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983)
- Rhoda Smith v. State, 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1992)
- Berlie Daniels, Jr. v. State, 595 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1992)
- Carlton J. Brown v. State, 599 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)