WYONA JUNE WALTON AND JAMES J. WALTON, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
CLAYTON RUNCK, JR., AND MADELYNE C. RUNCK, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
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The Waltons and Runcks entered into a 1981 real property exchange agreement that the trial court declared null and void due to the parties' inability to complete the exchange. The trial court used equitable powers to award the Waltons a 68% interest in the Florida property (Don-Dee Ranch) and ordered its sale. On appeal, the Waltons' challenges to the nullification were rejected, but the court reversed the trial court's authority to order the sale without a party request.
The trial court's declaration that the exchange agreement was null and void was proper, and the Waltons' contentions on appeal were without merit. However, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order a sale of the Don-Dee Ranch without a pleading or specific request from either party.
[1] A real property exchange agreement may be declared null and unenforceable if the parties are unable to exchange the subject properties according to its terms.
[2] A trial court may not order the sale of real property absent a pleading or specific request for such by the parties to the action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In fashioning a final judgment in this instance, the trial court exercised its broad powers of equity. In an effort to return the parties to their original positions, the trial court gave the Waltons a sixty-eight percent equity interest in the Florida property, otherwise known as the Don-Dee Ranch, with a thirty-two percent interest therein to the Runcks.”
Establishes the trial court's use of equitable powers and the distribution of interests awarded to each party
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1981, the Waltons and Runcks entered into a real property exchange agreement whereby the Waltons would exchange North Dakota property for Florida p…
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HALL, Judge.
The appellants, Wyona June and James J. Walton, contend the trial court erred in declaring a real property exchange agreement they entered into with the appellees, Clayton Runck, Jr. and Madelyne Runck, to be null and unenforceable. We disagree with the Waltons, finding the issues they raise on this appeal to be completely without merit. We further find that the points raised by the Runcks on cross appeal are equally without merit, except as to their contention that the trial court erred in ordering a sale of real property, which was subject to the exchange agreement at issue. In that regard, we agree and reverse.
In 1981, the Waltons and the Runcks entered into a real property exchange agreement, whereby the Waltons agreed to exchange property in North Dakota for Florida property the Runcks promised to, and eventually did, acquire. Each property was to have an equity value of approximately $550,-000 at the time of the exchange.
The trial court essentially-found that the exchange agreement was abandoned due to the inability of the parties to exchange the subject properties according to the terms of the 1981 agreement. The trial court, thus, declared the agreement null and void. The trial court also found that a power of attorney executed by Clayton Runck, Jr. in favor of one of his sons was invalid for various reasons.
In fashioning a final judgment in this instance, the trial court exercised its broad powers of equity. In an effort to return the parties to their original positions, the trial court gave the Waltons a sixty-eight percent equity interest in the Florida property, otherwise known as the Don-Dee Ranch, with a thirty-two percent interest therein to the Runcks. The trial court determined that the parties would realize their respective interests upon a sale of the Don-Dee Ranch, which the trial court duly ordered.
In their cross appeal, the Runcks contend, among other things, that the trial court was without authority to order a sale of the Don-Dee Ranch, absent a pleading or specific request for such by either of the parties to the instant action. The Waltons have stipulated that such was error and we agree.
Even though the trial judge may have foreseen further litigation between the parties herein and was attempting to make a final resolution of all matters by ordering a sale of the Florida property, there can .be no question that he was without jurisdiction to enter such an order disposing of the Don-Dee Ranch. See Ch. 64, Fla.Stat. (1991); Kirkland v. Kirkland, 492 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), and eases cited therein.
We therefore find the trial court erred in ordering a sale of the Don-Dee Ranch, absent a request for such by the parties. The trial court’s order, however, is affirmed in all other respects.
Accordingly, the instant case is remanded for correction of the final judgment consistent with this opinion.
FRANK, C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.