MARBLEE SEABROOK, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Florida Supreme Court affirmed that section 775.084's habitual felony offender sentencing statute does not violate due process, equal protection, or separation of powers, as trial judges retain discretion to decline such sentencing.
Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, does not violate due process, equal protection, or separation of powers because trial judges retain discretion to decline habitual felony offender sentencing.
[1] Trial judges retain discretion under section 775.084 to decline to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender, thereby preserving separation of powers.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSeabrook was sentenced as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), and the district court of appeal affirmed t…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review Seabrook v. State, 608 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court affirmed Seabrook’s sentencing as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989). The district court of appeal certified the following question as being of great public importance:
DOES SECTION 775.084, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), DENY EITHER DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW UNDER EITHER THE FLORIDA OR THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; OR VIOLATE THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, AS SET FORTH IN THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
Seabrook, 608 So. 2d at 560. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. This Court has previously held that section 775.084 does not violate due process or equal protection. Reeves v. State, 612 So. 2d 560 (Fla.1992); Ross v. State, 601 So. 2d 1190 (Fla.1992). In our opinion in McKnight v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla.1993), we adopted the rationale of King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla.2d DCA), review denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla.1992), and held that a trial judge has the discretion not to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender. Therefore, petitioner’s contention that the statute violated the doctrine of separation of powers because it deprived trial judges of such discretion necessarily fails.
For the reasons stated above, we answer the certified question in the negative, and approve the decision below.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, shaw, grimes, kogan and HARDING, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (22 total)
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State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)…s on the Legislature’s decision to include in the Act certain broad exceptions for the prosecutor’s consideration. They urge that this provision encroaches on the judiciary’s sentencing function, relying on the Court’s decision in Seabrook v. State, 629 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1993). Since the state attorney’s broad charging discretion already embodies any “exception discretion,” this argument is unpersuasive. Further, petitioners’ reliance on Seabrook is misplaced. In Seabrook, the petitioner specifically contended…
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Porter v. State, 629 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1993)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Porter v. State, 609 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court of appeal certified the same question we recently answered in the negative in Seabrook v. State, 629 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed in Seabrook, we once again answer the question in the negative and approve the decision below. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, sha…
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State v. Curtin, 764 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…tutes, establishes the procedure for declaring a defendant to be a habitual offender. This statute survived a challenge based on the separation of powers clause, precisely be [*648] cause it left some discretion to the courts. See Seabrook v. State, 629 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1993). A related sentencing statute, section 775.084(l)(d), sets the criteria for a declaration that an offender is a violent career criminal. This statute does not violate the separation of powers clause because it allows the trial judge discr…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Ross v. State, 601 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1992)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993)
- THE Florida BAR v. Neckman, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993)
- Reeves v. State, 612 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1992)
- Marblee Seabrook v. State, 608 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Chaison v. State, 608 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)