IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF OREGON K. HUNTER, APPELLANT,
v.
NANCY H. HUNTER, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1993-11-12
No. 93-1142
BOOTH, SMITH and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
626 So. 2d 1069 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed most aspects of the trial court's final judgment but reversed the child support provision as incorrectly written. The court held that child support should terminate when the child reaches age 18, marries, becomes self-supporting, or dies, and clarified that statutory exceptions for dependency beyond age 18 should be addressed through modification petitions rather than incorporated into the initial judgment.


Holding

The court reversed the child support duration provision as improper and incorrect. The court held that child support should terminate when each child reaches age 18, marries, becomes self-supporting, or dies, and that statutory exceptions allowing support beyond age 18 should be addressed through subsequent modification petitions rather than being incorporated into the initial final judgment.


Headnotes

[1] A child support provision in a dissolution of marriage judgment should generally terminate support upon a child reaching age eighteen, marrying, becoming self-supporting,…

[2] A court may order child support beyond the age of eighteen if the child's dependency is due to a mental or physical incapacity that began prior to majority, or if the chi…

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Key Quotes

“the provision incorrectly paraphrases the emphasized portion of the statute. Moreover, it is clear that the statute is intended to establish exceptions to the general rule regarding termination of a child support obligation.”

Explains why the trial court's child support language was improper and the proper legal framework

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties were married and had children together. The trial court issued a final judgment of dissolution of marriage requiring the appellant to pay …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, raising a number of issues. We affirm, without discussion, as to all but one of those issues.

The final judgment directs appellant to pay child support for the parties’ children “until such time as [each] child graduates from high school or attains the age of 19 years[,] whichever first occurs.” Appellant correctly argues that this provision is improper. We presume that the child support provision was included because of section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (1991), which reads:

This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years when such dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to such person reaching majority or if the person is dependent in fact, is between the ages of 18 and 19, and is still in high school, performing in good faith with a reasonable expectation of graduation before the age of 19.

(Emphasis added.) However, the provision incorrectly paraphrases the emphasized portion of the statute. Moreover, it is clear that the statute is intended to establish exceptions to the general rule regarding termination of a child support obligation. Therefore, we believe that the better practice is to resort in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage to the general rule, with the understanding that a petition to modify may be filed should it subsequently appear that one of the section 743.07(2) exceptions is applicable.

Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment which addresses the duration of appellant’s child support obligation. On remand, the trial court is directed to substitute for that provision the following:

5. The husband shall pay directly to the wife as child support for the minor children the sum of Nine Hundred Dollars ($900.00) per month per child until such time as each child reaches age eighteen, marries, becomes self-supporting or dies, whichever first occurs.

In all other respects, the final judgment of dissolution of marriage is affirmed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.

BOOTH, SMITH and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Dep't OF Revenue v. Hall, 699 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …pin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1984). When faced with the issue as to which parent should have the burden of establishing whether support should be extended for children dependent beyond their eighteenth birthday, the court in Hunter v. Hunter, 626 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), held: Moreover, it is clear that the statute is intended to establish exceptions to the general rule regarding termination of a child support obligation. Therefore, we believe that the better practice is to resort in a final ju…
    1 / 2
  • Goodwin v. Goodwin, 640 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …graduation, child support shall continue for such child through the month of June following that child’s 18th birthday.” The former husband argues that this provision is at odds with section 743.-07(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and Hunter v. Hunter, 626 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Section 743.07(2) provides that a court of competent jurisdiction is not prohibited from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 when such dependency is caused by mental or physical incapacity, or “if the p…
  • Drake v. Drake, 686 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    …, the trial court’s award of child support “until the parties’ minor child reaches the age of 19 or upon her graduation from high school, whichever occurs first” was error. Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 679 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Hunter v. Hunter, 626 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In section 743.07(2) the legislature established certain limited exceptions to the general rule that child support obligations are terminated upon the child reaching majority. Hunter, 626 So. 2d at 1070. This statute authorizes…

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