HAROLD D. MALL AND MARY A. MALL, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
SCOTT PAWELSKI AND LAURIE PAWELSKI, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court affirmed liability in a real estate dispute but reversed the damages award, holding that when a buyer replaces a roof that was near the end of its useful life with a superior roof, damages should be prorated to account for the increased life expectancy rather than awarded in full.
When a defective roof near the end of its useful life is replaced with a superior roof, damages must be prorated to account for the increased life expectancy to avoid unjust enrichment.
[1] When a buyer replaces a defective roof near the end of its useful life with a superior roof, damages should be measured by the prorated replacement cost accounting for th…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees purchased a seventeen-year-old house with a seventeen-year-old roof from appellants. The old roof began leaking shortly after appellees move…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Measure Of Damages cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the final judgment in favor of appellees in all respects, except we reverse and remand as to the amount of damages awarded by the trial court.
Appellees purchased a seventeen-year-old house with a seventeen-year-old roof from appellants. Although the old roof began leaking shortly after appellees moved into the house, appellees waited two years and then replaced the entire roof. The new roof had a twenty to twenty-five year guarantee. Because the old roof was near the end of its life expectancy, the trial court erred in awarding appellees the cost of the new roof. The new roof gave appellees a roof for which they did not bargain. Therefore, to allow full recovery for the cost of the new roof unjustly enriches appellees. Under these circumstances, we believe that the proper measure of damages is the replacement cost of the roof, prorated to account for the increased life expectancy of the new roof. Cf. Louisville Scrap Material Co. v. Petroleum Packers, Inc., 566 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 2d DCA1990); Doell v. Lachney, 544 So. 2d 519, 523 (La.App.1989). Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment in favor of appellees, but we reverse and remand as to the amount of damages only.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
GUNTHER and PARIENTE, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C„ Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Frazier v. State, 762 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…The sentencing guidelines scoresheet shows on its face that two convictions for which Frazier was being sentenced as an habitual felony offender were" improperly scored as “additional offenses.” § 775.084(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993); Eaddy v. State, 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Ricardo v. State, 608 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We reverse the denial of the motion on this point only and remand for resentencing based on a corrected score-sheet. We affirm the denial of relief on the remaining claims. S…
-
Sheffield v. State, 214 So. 3d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…eet. See Olsen v. State, 791 So. 2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Drayton v. State, 744 So. 2d 584, 585-86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Alexander v. State, 680 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Byrd v. State, 643 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Eaddy v. State, 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Ricardo v. State, 608 So. 2d 93, 94-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Silliker v. State, 598 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Wyche v. State, 576 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Accordingly, counts I and II should not have been…
-
Hunter v. State, 732 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…poses habitual offender dispositions on some counts but guidelines dispositions on other counts. See id. at 94-95; see also Alexander v. State, 680 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Chapman v. State, 672 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Eaddy v. State, 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).* The logic of Ricardo is apparently that it would unfairly increase the permitted sentence for the guidelines sentences if simultaneously-sentenced habitualized offenses are counted as the primary offense, or additional offenses…
Authorities Cited
- Louisville Scrap Material Co., Inc. v. Petroleum Packers, Inc., 566 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)