IN RE FORFEITURE OF 1985 4-DOOR CADILLAC VIN: 1G6CB69TIF4224633. JEFFREY DIAMOND, PROPERTY OWNER, APPELLANT,
v.
TOWN OF PALM BEACH, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1993-08-18
No. 92-1843
GUNTHER, J., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.
622 So. 2d 193 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases


Opinion of the Court
FARMER, Judge.

FARMER, Judge.

We reverse this summary judgment because we find genuine and material issues for resolution by the trier of fact. The owner of the property to be forfeited testified in the criminal trial and was convicted by a jury verdict of the underlying crime. The parties to the civil forfeiture action agreed that the court could take judicial notice of the testimony in the criminal case. The civil case was then transferred to the judge who had presided over the criminal trial. He took judicial notice of the criminal testimony and granted the Town of Palm Beach’s motion for summary judgment. We conclude that the court could not have done so without an impermissible weighing of conflicting evidence. Summary judgment was not designed for weighing conflicts.

REVERSED.

GUNTHER, J., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.


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  • State v. Fraser, 673 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …evidentiary standard to be employed in a forfeiture case necessary to defeat the motion of the claimant for summary judgment. In determining summary judgment, the trial court may not weigh the evidence. See In re Forfeiture of 1985 4-Door Cadillac, 622 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Moreover, if the court in fact drew all inferences from the evidence in favor of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, then one of the inferences must be that the money was contraband intended to be furnished in…

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