DONALD S. ZUCKERMAN, ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
HOFRICHTER & QUIAT, P.A., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1993-01-12
No. 92-2532
Before BARKDULL, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
622 So. 2d 1 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Zuckerman appeals the trial court's order setting a supersedeas bond amount required to stay a garnishment order pending appeal. The court holds that the trial court applied the wrong rule and should have exercised discretion under Rule 9.310(a) rather than mandating a bond under Rule 9.310(b)(1).


Holding

An order directing disbursement of a specific fund is governed by Rule 9.310(a), not Rule 9.310(b)(1). Under Rule 9.310(a), the trial court has discretion as to the nature and extent of security to be posted for a stay, rather than being required to mandate a bond in the full disputed amount.


Headnotes

[1] An order directing the disbursement of a specific fund pending appeal is governed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(a), not Rule 9.310(b)(1).

[2] When an order directing the disbursement of a specific fund is stayed pending appeal, the trial court has discretion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(a) re…

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Key Quotes

“This court has previously held that an order of this general type which directs the disbursement of a specific fund is governed by Rule 9.310(a), rather than Rule 9.310(b)(1).”

Establishes the controlling legal standard that orders directing disbursement of specific funds fall under the discretionary Rule 9.310(a), not the mandatory Rule 9.310(b)(1).

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Facts & Procedural History

Hofrichter & Quiat held an unsatisfied judgment against Zuckerman and garnished $75,000 owed to Zuckerman by Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. T…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(f), Donald S. Zuckerman moves for review of an order setting the amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted in order to stay the trial court’s order pending appeal. We grant the motion.

Appellee Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., holds an unsatisfied judgment against Zucker-man. Hofrichter & Quiat served a writ of garnishment on Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., which owed $75,000 to Zuck-erman. After evidentiary proceedings, the trial court entered an order rejecting Zuck-erman’s claim that the funds were statutorily exempt from garnishment pursuant to section 222.18, Florida Statutes (1991).* The court allocated the $75,000 amount be tween appellee and appellee’s counsel. The order determined the amount of credit to be allocated against Hofrichter & Quiat's outstanding judgment against Zuckerman. The order also directed Provident Life to deposit the funds in an interest-bearing bank account in the joint names of counsel for appellant and appellee as co-trustee. Zuckerman has appealed the garnishment order. Subsequently, the trial court ruled that in order for Zuckerman to supersede the garnishment order, it would be necessary to post a bond in accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(1), which applies when “the order is a judgment solely for the payment of money....” Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Zuckerman would be required to post a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the disputed fund plus the interest amount specified by Rule 9.310(b)(1). Further, this bond would be over and above the $75,000 fund. Zuckerman seeks review of the trial court’s order establishing the supersedeas amount.

This court has previously held that an order of this general type which directs the disbursement of a specific fund is governed by Rule 9.310(a), rather than Rule 9.310(b)(1). Dice v. Cameron, 424 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA), dismissed, 434 So. 2d 887 (Fla.1983). Other districts are in accord. Wilson v. Woodward, 602 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Florida Coast Bank of Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review dismissed, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984); see also Cerrito v. Kovitch, 406 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Mosar Developers, Inc. v. Creech & Wilson, Inc., 404 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); The Florida Bar, Florida Appellate Practice § 9.13 (2d ed. 1986); Phillip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 8.4 (1988). The trial court therefore had discretion under Rule 9.310(a) as to the nature and extent of the security to be posted for a stay.

Appellee argues that even under Rule 9.310(a), the result would be unchanged, because the order regarding the disputed fund does not provide appellee with adequate security. Those contentions should be addressed in the first instance to the trial court.

The order under review is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings under Rule 9.310(a).

*

The trial court observed that it was a close question whether the $75,000 insurance amount was statutorily exempt.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Alex Hofrichter, P.A. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, P.A., 710 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …aff'd, 646 So. 2d 187 (Fla.1994); Donald S. Zuckerman, P.A. v.Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 629 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Alex Hofrichter, P.A. v. Donald S. Zuckerman, P.A., 623 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 622 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). . For present purposes these claims must be taken as true, as the present proceeding arises on review of a summary judgment. . The decision in Rosen v. Marlin held in substance that a mere refusal to pay money owed under a cont…
  • …2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see also PS Capital, LLC v. Palm Springs [*998] Town Homes, LLC, 9 So. 3d 643, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Begonia Corp. v. NAM Fin. Corp., 724 So. 2d 714, 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 622 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Dice v. Cameron, 424 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).1 Thus, today’s decision by the Majority to not accept jurisdiction results in a state judicial’ system in which money judgments entered in one jurisdiction are less rel…

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