LOUIS A. LAUDECIO AND LUCILLE LAUDECIO, APPELLANTS,
v.
K-SITE 500 ASSOCIATES AND CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Buyers who obtained a binding mortgage commitment but unreasonably refused to close by declining to place cash in escrow for loan reserves defaulted under the purchase agreement, forfeiting their deposit.
A buyer who obtains a binding mortgage commitment but unreasonably refuses to satisfy a reasonable condition of that commitment—placing cash in escrow for loan reserves—defaults under the purchase agreement and forfeits the deposit.
[1] A buyer who obtains a binding mortgage commitment as defined in a purchase agreement but unreasonably refuses to satisfy a reasonable condition of that commitment default…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLouis and Lucille Laudecio agreed to purchase a condominium unit from K-Site 500 Associates. After obtaining a binding mortgage commitment from an ins…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff buyers Louis and Lucille Laudecio from an adverse summary judgment entered in an action to recover a deposit on the purchase of a condominium unit. Without burdening this opinion with the detailed negotiations involving mortgage financing conducted after the plaintiffs entered into an agreement to purchase the subject condominium unit, suffice it to say that the plaintiffs eventually declined to close on the sale of the unit after obtaining a binding mortgage commitment and the defendant seller K-Site 500 Associates retained the deposit paid by the plaintiffs. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, we conclude that (1) the plaintiffs obtained a binding mortgage commitment from an institutional lender, as defined in the sale agreement, to finance the instant purchase, but unreasonably declined to fulfill a reasonable condition to that commitment, namely, to place certain cash in escrow at closing for several months of principal, interest, taxes, and insurance, and (2) the refusal of the plaintiffs to close on the purchase of the condominium unit, although they had a binding mortgage commitment, violated the terms of the sale agreement. This being so, the plaintiffs’ default under the contract authorized the subject forfeiture of deposit. Johnson v. Wortzel, 517 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA1987), rev. denied, 528 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.1988); Ruiz v. Huddle, 420 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. 4th DCA1982); Bee Kay Realty Corp. v. Cayre, 256 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1972); Herrera y Nogueira v. Helker, 139 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA1962).
Affirmed.
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Bozeman v. State, 698 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…th DCA 1991); Dodson v. State, 356 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hernandez v. State, 569 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Davis v. State, 216 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); Allred v. State, 642 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Fletcher v. [*631] State, 619 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The “opening the door” concept is based on considerations of fairness and the truth-seeking function of a trial, where cross-examination reveals the whole story of a transaction only partly explained in direct examination. For…
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Mosley v. State, 739 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…(Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Dodson v. State, 356 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hernandez v. State, 569 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Davis v. State, 216 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); Allred v. State, 642 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Fletcher v. State, 619 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The “opening the door” concept is based on considerations of fairness and the truth-seeking function of a trial, where cross-examination reveals the whole story of a transaction only partly explained in direct examination. For e…
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Simmons v. State, 790 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…DCA 1994)(by testifying that he lacked a violent propensity and asserting that he had never hit a woman, defendant opened the door to rebuttal evidence that he had previously physically assaulted his former wife and a girlfriend); Fletcher v. State, 619 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)(where defendant testified during his direct examination that he had never pointed a gun at anybody and that he was a responsible user of firearms, the state was properly allowed to introduce evidence of an episode wherein the def…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nogueira v. Helker, 139 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Johnson v. Wortzel, 517 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Beekay Realty Corp. v. Cayre, 256 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Cayre v. BEE KAY Realty Corp., 263 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1972)
- Dorman v. State, 263 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1972)
- Ruiz v. Huddle, 420 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)