LIGHTSPEED OF MIAMI, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
JACK ECKERD CORPORATION AND WRC PROPERTIES, INC., APPELLEES
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Lightspeed of Miami, an on-premises photo processing business, appeals summary judgment in favor of its landlord WRC Properties and dismissal of its tortious interference claim against competitor Jack Eckerd Corporation. The appellate court reverses both decisions, finding that the trial court failed to consider Eckerd's lease rights before granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.
The court reversed summary judgment for WRC and reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference complaint against Eckerd, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding WRC's potential lease violation and Eckerd's legal justification for competing, which precluded summary judgment and dismissal at the pleading stage.
[1] A genuine issue of material fact exists, precluding summary judgment, when a court fails to consider the terms of a relevant lease agreement in a breach of lease action.
[2] A complaint for tortious interference is not subject to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the defendant's justification for competing was not consider…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, the trial court did not consider what Eckerd's rights were under its own lease with WRC. Therefore, the trial court could not have considered whether WRC's actions, in allowing Eckerd to do on-premises processing, were violative of Lightspeed's lease.”
Establishes the fundamental error: the trial court failed to examine Eckerd's lease when deciding whether WRC breached Lightspeed's lease.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLightspeed of Miami operated an on-premises photo processing business as a tenant of WRC Properties. WRC subsequently allowed Jack Eckerd Corporation,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
Lightspeed of Miami, Inc., an on-premises photo processing business, appeals summary judgment in favor of WRC Properties, Inc., in a breach of lease action, and appeals the dismissal of its complaint against Jack Eckerd Corporation in a tor- tious interference action. We reverse both the summary judgment and the dismissal of the complaint.
Lightspeed initially sued WRC, its landlord, claiming a breach of Lightspeed’s lease because WRC had allowed Eckerd to begin doing on-premises photo processing in competition with Lightspeed. The trial court granted summary judgment for WRC. However, the trial court did not consider what Eckerd’s rights were under its own lease with WRC. Therefore, the trial court could not have considered whether WRC’s actions, in allowing Eckerd to do on-premises processing, were violative of Lightspeed’s lease. Because Eck-erd’s lease was not considered, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment, and reverse the summary judgment granted in favor of WRC. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Baad v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 606 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Furthermore, since the terms of Eckerd’s lease were not considered, it was impossible for the trial court to conclude from Lightspeed’s complaint that Eckerd was justified in competing with Lightspeed. Consequently, Lightspeed did not fail to state a cause of action for tortious interference against Eckerd, and we reverse the dismissal of Lightspeed’s complaint against Eckerd. See Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla.1985); Continental Ins. Co. v. Parkins, 502 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Reversed.
FERGUSON and LEVY, JJ., concur.
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge
(specially concurring).
I agree with reversal as to both appel-lees. I would make it clear, however, that, quite apart from Eckerd’s rights under its own lease, a genuine issue, resolvable only by extrinsic evidence, is presented as to whether a proper interpretation of Light-speed’s lease obligated the landlord to prohibit Eckerd’s competitive activity, see Liza Danielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see generally Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Harbor Club Villas Condominium Ass’n, 419 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Mead v. Mead, 193 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1967), and, therefore, whether Eckerd’s conduct amounted to an unprivileged, tortious interference with that agreement. See 32 Fla. Jur.2d Interference § 2 (1981).
FERGUSON, J., concurs.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. J.C. Cotton and Aubrey Jesse Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1985)
- Liza Danielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 419 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Mead v. Mead, 193 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Baad v. Sec. Ins. Co. OF Hartford & Norwood Shell, Inc., 606 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Mead v. Mead, 201 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1967)
- Padley v. Blamberg, 201 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1967)
- Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Parkins, 502 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)