EMILIO ALMAYOR AND TELVIA ALMAYOR, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1993-01-26
No. 91-2208
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and FERGUSON and GERSTEN, JJ.
613 So. 2d 526 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1993) Caution
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Emilio Almayor was severely burned when gasoline he siphoned from a car in a homeowner's driveway ignited from a cigarette. The court reversed summary judgment for State Farm, holding that the homeowner's insurance policy covered the incident because the fire arose from the insured's negligent use of flammable material, not from automobile ownership or use, and thus the automobile exclusion did not apply.


Holding

The court held that the accident arose out of the insured's allegedly negligent use of flammable material (the lit cigarette), not the ownership, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle under repair. Therefore, the automobile exclusion does not apply, and the homeowner's insurance policy covers the potential liability.


Headnotes

[1] A homeowner's insurance policy may cover liability arising from the negligent use of flammable material, even if the material was sourced from a vehicle, when the acciden…

[2] An "automobile exclusion" in a homeowner's insurance policy does not apply when the insured's negligent act, rather than the vehicle's operation, is the direct cause of t…

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Key Quotes

“the accident "arose out of" Ramirez's allegedly negligent use of flammable material, not the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle under repair. Indeed, the car had little, if anything, to do with the fire at all.”

Establishes the court's key distinction that liability arose from the insured's conduct with the cigarette and gasoline, not from automobile use, making the automobile exclusion inapplicable.

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Facts & Procedural History

Almayor came to the home owner's request to repair her car parked in the driveway. He siphoned gasoline from the tank and poured it into a bucket plac…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

At the owner’s request, Almayor came to her home to “check out” and perhaps re pair her car. In the course of working on the vehicle, which was parked in the driveway, Almayor siphoned gasoline from the tank and poured it into a bucket which was placed next to the steps of the house. At that point, one of the residents, Ramirez, who was insured by a State Farm homeowner’s policy, came out of the house with a freshly-lit cigarette in his hand. The cigarette ignited the gasoline fumes and caused a fire and explosion which severely burned Almayor. He and his wife now appeal from a summary declaratory judgment granted State Farm that its policy did not cover Ramirez’s potential liability because of the familiar “automobile exclusion.” 1

We reverse on the ground that the accident “arose out of” Ramirez’s allegedly negligent use of flammable material, not the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle under repair. Indeed, the car had little, if anything, to do with the fire at all. It was merely the coincidental and legally remote source of a component, the gasoline, which was itself harmless until acted upon by the insured’s negligence. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Goldman, 374 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA1979), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1980). Homeowner’s insurance is expressly designed to protect against just this kind of individual liability, Conversely, automobile insurance and the automobile exclusion do not apply. Steir v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 227 A.D. 37, 237 N.Y.S. 40 (1929), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 576, 173 N.E., 873 (1930); Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 68 N.C.App. 184, 314 S.E. 2d 552 (1984), review denied, 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E. 2d 142 (1984); see Roche v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 247 A.D. 335, 287 N.Y.S. 38 (1936), aff’d, 273 N.Y. 473, 6 N.E. 2d 410 (1936). See generally Hernandez v. Protective Casualty Ins. Co., 473 So. 2d 1241 (Fla.1985); Fortune Ins. Co. v. Exilus, 608 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA1992); Hanson v. General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp., 450 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA1984); O’Dwyer v. Manchester Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA1974); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 273 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA1973), cert. denied, 282 So. 2d 638 (Fla.1973). Compare Volkswagen Ins. Co. v. Nguyen, 405 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 3d DCA1981), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982) (automobile exclusion applicable when spark from automobile ignited gasoline being poured by insured into carburetor). Accordingly, the judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment on coverage for the Almayors.

Reversed and remanded.

. The exclusion provides:

“1. Coverage L [Personal Liability does) not apply to:
** e. bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of:
**

(2). a motor vehicle owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured[.]”


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Martinez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 982 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
    …bject upon the driveway at the time of its collapse happened to be a car. As such, the automobile became a mere instrumentality of the injuries to Avila, devoid of any causal connection to Avila’s injuries. See Almayor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 613 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). In Almayor, we found that this type of policy exclusion did not preclude coverage despite the fact that the injuries occurred while a vehicle was being repaired. Alma-yor had, at the request of an insured, traveled to her h…
    1 / 2
  • …citing National Indemnity Co. v. Corbo, 248 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)). The Florida courts have held that use of the phrase “arising out of’ indicates a “causal relationship” to the incident. See, e.g., Almayor v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 613 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (finding that exclusion did not apply because injuries did not “arise out of’ particular excluded act, but rather, arose out of a coincidental and legally remote source). This is consistent with the general consensus of other juri…
  • Zucker v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2017)
    …where the insured was hurt when a driveway collapsed while he was changing the oil on his car because “it was pure chance that the object upon the driveway at the time of its collapse happened to be a car”); Almayor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 613 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that an injury did not arise out of the “ownership, maintenance or use of [a] motor vehicle” where plaintiff was injured in an explosion caused when a cigarette ignited gasoline fumes from gas that had been siphoned…

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