SUSAN E. ROESSLER, AS EXECUTRIX, APPELLANT,
v.
F. C. ARMSTRONG, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. | 1915-01-15
Taylor, C. J., and Shackleford, Cockrell, and Ellis. JJ., concur.
69 Fla. 1 Florida Supreme Court (1915) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A mortgagee sought to enforce a mortgage lien for unpaid attorney fees incurred in collecting a debt. The Florida Supreme Court held that attorney fees could only be recovered if the underlying mortgage and note expressly authorized them, and that the defeasance clause provision for fees in collection "by foreclosure or otherwise" must be interpreted narrowly to apply only when foreclosure or similar legal action is involved.


Holding

The mortgagee cannot recover attorney fees for non-foreclosure collection efforts. The defeasance clause provision for attorney fees "by foreclosure or otherwise" must be interpreted narrowly using ejusdem generis principles to mean only fees incurred in connection with foreclosure or similar legal proceedings. Because the underlying note did not authorize attorney fees and the mortgage covenants limited such fees to foreclosure collection, fees for voluntary collection without legal action cannot be enforced.


Key Quotes

“The terms of the defeasance clause of the mortgage cannot be given a greater effect than is warranted by the note secured by the mortgage or by the express covenants contained in the mortgage.”

Establishes the principle that a mortgage's provisions are limited by the underlying note and express covenants.

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Facts & Procedural History

A mortgage was executed with a defeasance clause allowing the mortgagee to recover attorney fees incurred "in collecting the same by foreclosure or ot…

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Opinion of the Court
Whitfield, J.

Whitfield, J.

Suit was brought by the appellant against a purchaser4 of the original mortgaged property, to enforce a mortgage lien upon lands for a balance of $285.21 alleged to be due on the mortgage indebtedness as principal, interest, cost and reasonable attorneys’ fees. At the final hearing the bill of complaint was dismissed, and complainant appealed.

The note does not require the payment of an attorney’s fee for the collection of the indebtedness. The defeasance clause of the mortgage provides that upon the payment of the “note with interest * together with all costs, charges and expenses, including a reasonable attorney’s fee,” incurred “in collecting the same by foreclosure or otherwise ” then the mortgage shall “be absolutely null and void.” There is an express covenant in the mortgage to pay the “note with interest and all costs, charges and expenses, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, * in collecting the same by foreclosure.” The defendants purchased the property subject to the mortgage, but did not expressly covenant to pay the amount for which the mortgage lien was given.

It appears that the mortgage was put in the hands of an attorney for collection; that payments were made to the attorney reducing the amount; that the final payment demanded was $1,949.21 for balance due as principal, interest and attorney fees; that all of this final amount demanded by the attorney was paid except $285.21, which was the amount demanded as attorney fees, and this suit is brought to enforce the payment.

The expression “or otherwise” appearing in the quotation from the defeasance clause of the mortgage should receive an episdem generis interpretation, when considered in connection with the provision for attorney’s fees when the collection is “by foreclosure.” See Words & Phrases “Otherwise” and cases therein cited.

The terms of the defeasance clause of the mortgage cannot be given a greater effect than is warranted by the note secured by the mortgage or by the express covenants contained in the mortgage. As the note does not provide for attorney’s fees and as the express covenants of the mortgage provide for attorney fees only when collection is “by foreclosure,” the statement in the defeasance clause that the lien will be void upon payment of the note with interest and attorney’s fees incurred in collecting “by foreclosure or otherwise,” does not require the payment of attorney’s fees when the collection is not “by foreclosure.” The balance of $285.21 sought to be enforced in this suit is the amount of the attorney’s fees claimed not for collection “by foreclosure,” but for collection made by the attorney without “foreclosure” or other suit or action. The demand therefore is not covered by the note or the mortgage, and the amount claimed cannot be collected in this suit brought to enforce the lien of the mortgage.

Decree affirmed.

Taylor, C. J., and Shackleford, Cockrell, and Ellis. JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Pool v. Thomas, 93 Fla. 285 (Fla. 1927)
    …he mortgagors to pay attorney’s fees, even though the principal and interest secured by said mortgage and evidenced by the notes sued on had prior to suit had been paid off, satisfied and discharged. ’ ’ In the case of Rossler v. Armstrong, et al., 69 Fla. 1, 67 Sou. 229, this Court says: “Where the note does not provide for attorney’s fees, and the express covenants of the mortgage, given to secure the payment of the note, provide for attorney’s fees only when collection is ‘by foreclosure’ a statemen…

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