KRISTIAN PATTERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Patterson appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, claiming the trial court failed to honor his plea agreement regarding concurrent sentencing and credit for time served. The appellate court reverses in part, finding merit in two of Patterson's three claims: that the trial judge orally agreed to concurrent sentencing with a Texas conviction and that a clerical error incorrectly reduced his time-served credit from 485 days to 100 days.
The court reversed the trial court's denial of postconviction relief as to the first two claims and remanded for the trial court to enter a corrected sentencing form and re-examine whether Patterson is entitled to concurrent sentencing with his Texas sentence. The court affirmed the denial of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was facially insufficient.
[1] A trial court's denial of postconviction relief may be reversed in part if some, but not all, of the defendant's claims have merit.
[2] A trial court's oral pronouncements at a plea hearing may contradict a written sentencing order, requiring correction.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge ruled that, if possible, Patterson may serve his sentence for the crime committed in Florida concurrently with the crime committed in Texas”
Establishes that the trial judge made an oral ruling regarding concurrent sentencing, which was not refuted by the written plea agreement
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatterson entered into a plea agreement with the state. At the plea hearing, the trial judge ruled that Patterson could serve his Florida sentence con…
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PER CURIAM.
Patterson seeks review of the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. Patterson raises three claims to support his motion, tVo of which have merit. We therefore reverse, in part, the denial of the motion and remand for further proceedings.
Patterson first contends that the trial court failed to honor his plea agreement. Specifically, he argues that the trial court orally agreed that his sentence would run concurrent with the prison term imposed for a crime committed in Texas. Patterson further argues that the trial judge ruled that he may serve his sentence in the Texas prison where he was already incarcerated for a crime committed in that state.
The trial judge denied postconviction relief on this claim because the plea agreement does not provide that his sentence for the crime committed in Florida be served in Texas. While the plea agreement is silent on this point, the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that the trial judge ruled that, if possible, Patterson may serve his sentence for the crime committed in Florida concurrently with the crime committed in Texas. Accordingly, the order of denial for postconviction relief does not refute this allegation.
Second, Patterson claims that the sentencing order incorrectly provides for 100 days credit for time served. He contends that at the plea hearing the judge ordered that he receive 485 days credit. In denying relief on this allegation, the trial judge relied on the sentencing order which provides that Patterson was to receive a “stipulated” 100 days credit. However, the transcript of the plea hearing supports Patterson’s allegation on this point. The state in its response concedes the clerical error in the sentencing order. Patterson’s remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is facially insufficient. Therefore, the trial court properly denied relief on this allegation.
We reverse and remand the trial court’s order of denial to the extent that it denied relief on Patterson’s first and second claims and otherwise affirm. On remand, the court is directed to enter a corrected sentencing form and to re-examine the files and records to determine whether anything therein conclusively shows that Patterson is not entitled to serve his sentence concurrently with the sentence for the crime committed in Texas.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur.
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Hightower v. State, 650 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…onsecutively, states a prima facie case for relief under rule 3.850. Bryant v. State, 355 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Schroeder v. State, 641 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Allen v. State, 616 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Patterson v. State, 611 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Jackson v. State, 442 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The trial court’s attachments to its final order — consisting of excerpts from the plea hearing during which Hightower told the judge that he wished to be sentenced the same d…
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Schroeder v. State, 641 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…s (including the federal sentence) would all run concurrent. When Schroeder was denied the opportunity to withdraw his plea after it was apparent that his “bargained for” consideration had failed, his plea became involuntary. See Patterson v. State, 611 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Allen v. State, 616 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith. GOSHORN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.…