QUEEN TUCKER MOORE, A/K/A QUEEN LEDEAL MOORE, A/K/A QUEEN TUCKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Queen Moore appealed her convictions for attempted first-degree murder and shooting within a building. The appellate court affirmed her convictions but reversed both sentences due to sentencing errors related to habitual offender enhancements, remanding for new sentencing hearings.
The trial court erred in sentencing Moore as a habitual offender for attempted first-degree murder because the habitual offender statute makes no provision for enhancing life felonies. For the shooting within a building conviction, the trial court failed to make specific findings on the record required by the habitual offender statute, and the record was insufficient to demonstrate that Moore met the statutory requirements.
[1] A life felony sentence cannot be enhanced under the habitual offender statute.
[2] A trial court must make specific findings on the record to support a habitual felony offender sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, makes no provision for the enhancement of a life felony, the trial court erred in sentencing Moore as a habitual offender for that offense.”
Establishes that the habitual offender statute cannot be used to enhance sentences for life felonies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoore was convicted by jury of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and shooting within a building. For the attempted murder conviction, her s…
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PARKER, Acting Chief Judge.
Queen Moore appeals her convictions and sentences for attempted first-degree murder and shooting within a building. Although Moore raises five issues in this appeal, we find merit only in the two sentencing issues. Therefore, we affirm Moore’s convictions, but reverse her sentences and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.
The jury found Moore guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm; thus, her sentence was enhanced to a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). Because the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, makes no provision for the enhancement of a life felony, the trial court erred in sentencing Moore as a habitual offender for that offense. See McKinney v. State, 585 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Therefore, we vacate this sentence and remand for resen- fencing pursuant to the sentencing guidelines.
As to the sentence for the shooting within a building conviction, we conclude that the trial court failed to make the specific findings on the record pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), to support the habitual felony offender sentence. See Rowland v. State, 583 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The state points out that defense counsel acknowledged that Moore' qualified as a habitual offender.1 However, defense counsel simply made a general statement agreeing that she could be classified as a habitual felony offender. It is impossible for this court to ascertain whether the requirements for a habitual felony offender sentence were met. See § 775.084(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). The record contains a copy of a certified copy of only one felony conviction and no presentence investigation report. There is no mention in the record of a second conviction which would qualify under the habitual felony offender statute. Thus, we vacate this sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Because Moore failed to object in the trial court that the requirements were lacking, the trial court on remand should permit the state to offer evidence concerning whether Moore should be considered as a habitual felony offender,2 and thereafter resentence Moore. See Kerney v. State, 605 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Frazier v. State, 595 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2d DCA1992). If the trial court finds that Moore meets the requirements of the habitual offender statute, the specific findings should be included in the record.
The sentences are reversed and remanded with directions.
PATTERSON and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. . During the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel if he agreed that Moore qualified as a habitual felony offender. Defense counsel responded, "I agree she could be so classified.”
. See Taylor v. State, 576 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
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Green v. State, 647 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…o harmless error analysis). Accordingly, we reverse Green’s sentence and remand for resentencing. Upon remand, if the lower court makes the requisite findings, it may again sentence Green as a habitual offender. Livernois; see also Moore v. State, 608 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. RYDER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and FULMER, JJ., concur.…
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Livernois v. State, 625 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…iolent felony offender sentence pursuant to section 775.-084(l)(b). In this ease, the court failed to make the specific findings required by section 775.084(3)(d) before sentencing the appellant pursuant to section 775.084(1)(b). See Moore v. State, 608 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Rowland v. State, 583 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The court simply stated that “the documentation that has been filed with the Court supports a finding, and the Court so finds that [appellant] is a habitual violent felony offe…
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Queen Ledeal Tucker v. State, 633 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…BLUE, Judge. Queen Ledeal Tucker contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it resen-teneed her after her successful appeal in Moore v. State, 608 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We agree and reverse for resentenc-ing. [*1148] The final opinion in Moore was filed on November 18, 1992, and the mandate issued on December 4. The trial court sentenced Tucker, however, on November 25, 1992. Until the mandate w…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McKINNEY v. State, 585 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Frazier v. State, 595 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Kerney v. State, 605 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Rowland v. State, 583 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Maynard v. State, 583 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Taylor v. State, 576 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)