DORAL COUNTRY CLUB, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM JUNIOR DUNCAN, APPELLEE
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Doral Country Club appealed a jury verdict finding it negligent in a personal injury case arising from an accident involving a guest using a weightlifting machine. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the defendant's arguments regarding jury composition, expert witness testimony, and trial procedure.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying any of the defendant's motions. The juror's conscientiousness in seeking guidance from the trial judge supported a presumption that she followed instructions not to share personal knowledge. The expert witness testimony did not establish that the defendant had insurance coverage and did not warrant a mistrial, particularly given the trial court's curative instruction. No errors were shown to warrant reversal.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a post-trial motion for jury interview absent evidence that a juror failed to follow instructions.
[2] The mere fact that a party lost a case does not, by itself, indicate that a juror did not follow the trial judge's instructions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we must presume that Ms. Brown, who was conscientious enough to seek guidance on this point from the trial judge, was true to her oath and complied with the trial judge's instructions”
Establishes the standard for evaluating whether a juror followed trial court instructions, based on the juror's demonstrated conscientiousness in seeking guidance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Junior Duncan, a guest at defendant Doral Country Club's hotel, was injured while using a weightlifting machine in the defendant's guest exerc…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Doral Country Club, Inc. from a final judgment entered upon an adverse jury verdict in a personal injury negligence action arising out of an accident which occurred while the plaintiff William Junior Duncan, as a guest of the defendant hotel, was using a weightlifting machine in the defendant’s guest exercise room. We affirm.
First, no abuse of discretion has been shown in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s post-trial motion for a jury interview. Contrary to the defendant’s argument, there is no indication whatever that the juror Patricia Brown did not follow the trial judge’s instruction not to share with the jury Ms. Brown’s personal knowledge, as a registered nurse, concerning glaucoma; Ms. Brown had previously sent a written note to the trial judge during jury deliberations asking whether she could reveal such information. The mere fact that the defendant lost the case is not, as urged, some indication that Ms. Brown did not follow the trial judge’s response to the subject note so as to trigger a post-trial jury interview. To the contrary, we must presume that Ms. Brown, who was conscientious enough to seek guidance on this point from the trial judge, was true to her oath and complied with the trial judge’s instructions. See Orange County v. Fuller, 502 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); National Indem. Co. v. Andrews, 354 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.1978).
Second, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a defense expert witness on vocational rehabilitation testified on cross examination by the plaintiff that she was employed by a company which was wholly owned by “an insurance adjusting company.” Contrary to the defendant’s argument, this testimony did not establish that the defendant had insurance coverage for the accident involved in this case; nor is there any other evidence adduced which, together with this testimony, established that the defendant had insurance coverage. This being so, the defendant was clearly not entitled to a mistrial as it was in no way prejudiced by the complained-of testimony. In any event, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence and thus cured whatever error may have occurred in originally receiving such testimony. See Sayad v. Alley, 508 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1278 (Fla.1987); Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
Finally, we find no merit in the remaining two points on appeal. There is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a second physical examination of the defendant. See Motor Union Orion Ins. Co. v. Levenson, 153 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.360. Nor was the defendant denied a fair trial by the “cumulative effect” of the above-claimed errors because no such errors were ever shown. See Johnson v. Canteen Corp., 528 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
The final judgment under review is therefore, in all respects,
Affirmed.
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Reynolds v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Ymca of Greater Miami, 621 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI We grant petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari, and quash the order granting defendant’s motion to compel an additional psychological evaluation. See Doral Country Club, Inc. v. Duncan, 598 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Motor Union Orion Ins., Co. v. Levenson, 153 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). A review of the record demonstrates that “good cause for the examination” has not been shown, Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.360(a)(2); see Williams v. Williams, 550 So…
Authorities Cited
- Seminole Shell Co., Inc. v. Clearwater Flying Co., Inc., 156 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Sue L. Andrews et vir., 354 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Motor Union (Aviation) Orion Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Franklyn Levenson, 153 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Sayad v. Alley, 508 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Johnson v. Canteen Corp., 528 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Orange Cnty. v. Fuller, 502 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Calhoun v. State, 502 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)