JOHN B. WEBB, III, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1992-03-27
No. 91-1703
GOSHORN, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.
595 So. 2d 1103 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the engineer's actions, while a contract dispute, did not constitute 'misconduct' under the statute.


Headnotes

[1] A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it is so ambiguous that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

[2] A broad statutory term, such as "misconduct," may be constitutionally permissible if further defined by administrative rules.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The respondent engineer was found guilty of misconduct by the Board of Professional Engineers for billing a client for additional fees beyond the orig…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
COWART, Judge.

COWART, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final order of the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers, finding the respondent, John B. Webb, III, guilty of misconduct in the practice of engineering.

Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, regulates the practice of engineering in this state. Section 471.033(l)(g), Florida Statutes, provides for disciplinary proceedings and sanctions against licensed engineers for “misconduct” in the practice of engineering. This statute does not further define that term although the Board of Professional Engineers has by rule specified a number of acts as constituting “misconduct.” See Rule 21 H-19.001(6)(a)-{r), Florida Administrative Code.

The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that a statute be declared void if it is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816 (Fla.1983); D’Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164 (Fla.1977). The word “misconduct” is extremely broad and the legislature should further define its meaning when using it as a basis for imposition of sanctions. Nevertheless, we decline to hold the statute unconstitutionally vague following Richardson v. State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). See also Cohn v. Department of Professional Regulation, All So. 2d 1039, 1044-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). However, after reviewing the undisputed facts in this case we find that they amount to no more than a contract dispute or misunderstanding between the engineer and his client involving the engineer’s billing the client for additional fees for services beyond the original fee agreement and the engineer’s attempt to collect additional fees which the client felt were excessive. Accordingly we reverse the order of the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers, and set aside the determination that the respondent was guilty of misconduct in the practice of engineering.

REVERSED.

GOSHORN, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Mitchel Westerheide v. State, 767 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …he state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that one of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”) (citing Webb v. Department of Prof'l Regulation, 595 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)). The supreme court in Hagan also held that the Legislature’s failure to define a term in a statute does not in and of itself render the statute unconstitutionally vague. If the definition of a term is not provided in the statut…
  • State v. Rawlins, 623 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
    …of the state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Webb v. Department of Professional Regulation, 595 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The fundamental concern of the vagueness doctrine is that people be placed on notice of what conduct is illegal. State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.1989). A vague law is one whi…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw